Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism
The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Hilary Kornblith’s (2002) argument for excluding conceptual analysis from epistemological inquiry, and then provide three objections to it. More specifically, Kornblith argues that epistemological properties such as ‘knowledge’ reduce to natural kinds (wi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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University of Tartu
2014-03-01
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| Series: | Studia Philosophica Estonica |
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| Online Access: | http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/view/167 |
| _version_ | 1818914805020360704 |
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| author | Nathan Robert Cockram |
| author_facet | Nathan Robert Cockram |
| author_sort | Nathan Robert Cockram |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Hilary Kornblith’s (2002) argument for excluding conceptual analysis from epistemological inquiry, and then provide three objections to it. More specifically, Kornblith argues that epistemological properties such as ‘knowledge’ reduce to natural kinds (with a constitutive essence) which can only be discovered and investigated using the a posteriori methods of the natural sciences. Thus, he continues, conceptual analysis can’t properly illuminate the target domain. The three objections to Kornblith’s argument which I present are as follows: (i) Multiple Realizeability, (ii) Psychological Explanation, (iii) Starting Points. On strength of these objections, I conclude that Kornblith’s brand of a posteriori epistemology both eliminates our ability to make epistemic evaluations in general, and also implies a strong form of scepticism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T23:52:13Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-4e3a50440ff243d1b09e80a11fc11898 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1736-5899 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T23:52:13Z |
| publishDate | 2014-03-01 |
| publisher | University of Tartu |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studia Philosophica Estonica |
| spelling | doaj.art-4e3a50440ff243d1b09e80a11fc118982022-12-21T20:01:07ZdeuUniversity of TartuStudia Philosophica Estonica1736-58992014-03-017.113410.12697/spe.2014.7.1.01Challenging Exclusionary NaturalismNathan Robert Cockram0Department of Philosophy, Carleton UniversityThe purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Hilary Kornblith’s (2002) argument for excluding conceptual analysis from epistemological inquiry, and then provide three objections to it. More specifically, Kornblith argues that epistemological properties such as ‘knowledge’ reduce to natural kinds (with a constitutive essence) which can only be discovered and investigated using the a posteriori methods of the natural sciences. Thus, he continues, conceptual analysis can’t properly illuminate the target domain. The three objections to Kornblith’s argument which I present are as follows: (i) Multiple Realizeability, (ii) Psychological Explanation, (iii) Starting Points. On strength of these objections, I conclude that Kornblith’s brand of a posteriori epistemology both eliminates our ability to make epistemic evaluations in general, and also implies a strong form of scepticism.http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/view/167Kornblithconceptual analysisnaturalized epistemology |
| spellingShingle | Nathan Robert Cockram Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism Studia Philosophica Estonica Kornblith conceptual analysis naturalized epistemology |
| title | Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism |
| title_full | Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism |
| title_fullStr | Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism |
| title_short | Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism |
| title_sort | challenging exclusionary naturalism |
| topic | Kornblith conceptual analysis naturalized epistemology |
| url | http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/view/167 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nathanrobertcockram challengingexclusionarynaturalism |