Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2014-11-01
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Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
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Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_article |
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author | Pascal J. Kieslich Benjamin E. Hilbig |
author_facet | Pascal J. Kieslich Benjamin E. Hilbig |
author_sort | Pascal J. Kieslich |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness. |
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format | Article |
id | doaj.art-4eb3881e444b4617abb125a5137aae80 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1930-2975 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:30:39Z |
publishDate | 2014-11-01 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | Article |
series | Judgment and Decision Making |
spelling | doaj.art-4eb3881e444b4617abb125a5137aae802023-09-03T10:05:07ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752014-11-01951052210.1017/S1930297500006392Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamicsPascal J. Kieslich0Benjamin E. Hilbig1Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Schloss Ehrenhof Ost, 68131 Mannheim, GermanyCognitive Psychology Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, GermanyRecently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_articlesocial dilemmaresponse dynamicscooperationcognitive conflictintuitionmouse-trackingpersonalityHonesty-Humility |
spellingShingle | Pascal J. Kieslich Benjamin E. Hilbig Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics Judgment and Decision Making social dilemma response dynamics cooperation cognitive conflict intuition mouse-tracking personality Honesty-Humility |
title | Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics |
title_full | Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics |
title_fullStr | Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics |
title_full_unstemmed | Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics |
title_short | Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics |
title_sort | cognitive conflict in social dilemmas an analysis of response dynamics |
topic | social dilemma response dynamics cooperation cognitive conflict intuition mouse-tracking personality Honesty-Humility |
url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_article |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pascaljkieslich cognitiveconflictinsocialdilemmasananalysisofresponsedynamics AT benjaminehilbig cognitiveconflictinsocialdilemmasananalysisofresponsedynamics |