Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics

Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Pascal J. Kieslich, Benjamin E. Hilbig
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2014-11-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_article
_version_ 1797701117011820544
author Pascal J. Kieslich
Benjamin E. Hilbig
author_facet Pascal J. Kieslich
Benjamin E. Hilbig
author_sort Pascal J. Kieslich
collection DOAJ
description Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.
first_indexed 2024-03-12T04:30:39Z
format Article
id doaj.art-4eb3881e444b4617abb125a5137aae80
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 1930-2975
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-12T04:30:39Z
publishDate 2014-11-01
publisher Cambridge University Press
record_format Article
series Judgment and Decision Making
spelling doaj.art-4eb3881e444b4617abb125a5137aae802023-09-03T10:05:07ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752014-11-01951052210.1017/S1930297500006392Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamicsPascal J. Kieslich0Benjamin E. Hilbig1Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Schloss Ehrenhof Ost, 68131 Mannheim, GermanyCognitive Psychology Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, GermanyRecently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_articlesocial dilemmaresponse dynamicscooperationcognitive conflictintuitionmouse-trackingpersonalityHonesty-Humility
spellingShingle Pascal J. Kieslich
Benjamin E. Hilbig
Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
Judgment and Decision Making
social dilemma
response dynamics
cooperation
cognitive conflict
intuition
mouse-tracking
personality
Honesty-Humility
title Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
title_full Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
title_fullStr Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
title_full_unstemmed Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
title_short Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
title_sort cognitive conflict in social dilemmas an analysis of response dynamics
topic social dilemma
response dynamics
cooperation
cognitive conflict
intuition
mouse-tracking
personality
Honesty-Humility
url https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_article
work_keys_str_mv AT pascaljkieslich cognitiveconflictinsocialdilemmasananalysisofresponsedynamics
AT benjaminehilbig cognitiveconflictinsocialdilemmasananalysisofresponsedynamics