Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas: An analysis of response dynamics
Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study...
Main Authors: | Pascal J. Kieslich, Benjamin E. Hilbig |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2014-11-01
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Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500006392/type/journal_article |
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