Optimal coalition splitting with heterogenous strategies
Purpose – The authors characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game. Design/methodology/approach – In contrast to the existing literature, the authors do not assume that after splitting, players will...
Main Authors: | Raouf Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho, Weihua Ruan, Benteng Zou |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Emerald Publishing
2023-12-01
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Series: | Fulbright Review of Economics and Policy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/FREP-05-2023-0021/full/pdf |
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