A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, proper...

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Main Author: Mark Povich
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Copernicus Center Press 2023-12-01
Series:Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Subjects:
Online Access:https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/648
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author Mark Povich
author_facet Mark Povich
author_sort Mark Povich
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description Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
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spelling doaj.art-4f71c22e0f8d4738a167b9cd6bca16da2024-03-24T01:12:42ZdeuCopernicus Center PressZagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce0867-82862451-06022023-12-017417122310.59203/zfn.74.648596A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanationMark Povich0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8124-4311University of RochesterDistinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/648scientific explanationphilosophy of sciencephilosophy of mathematicsmathematical explanationontic conceptionconventionalism
spellingShingle Mark Povich
A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
scientific explanation
philosophy of science
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical explanation
ontic conception
conventionalism
title A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
title_full A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
title_fullStr A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
title_full_unstemmed A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
title_short A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
title_sort conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
topic scientific explanation
philosophy of science
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical explanation
ontic conception
conventionalism
url https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/648
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