Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones
In this paper I claim that although second Wittgenstein's conception of meaning has been thought asan attack to thc notion ofrepresentation, i! is compatible with this notion as it is meant in cognitive science. In order to show this, first, 1 reconstruct Wittgenstein's thesis. Second, I d...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF)
1999-05-01
|
| Series: | Análisis Filosófico |
| Online Access: | https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/580/420 |
| _version_ | 1797627461993758720 |
|---|---|
| author | Liza Skidelsky |
| author_facet | Liza Skidelsky |
| author_sort | Liza Skidelsky |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper I claim that although second Wittgenstein's conception of meaning has been thought asan attack to thc notion ofrepresentation, i! is compatible with this notion as it is meant in cognitive science. In order to show this, first, 1 reconstruct Wittgenstein's thesis. Second, I detach the representational thesis from the intemalist and epistemological ones. Then I show that the opponents of the wittgensteinian conception of meaning are the last two thesis. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T10:24:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-50bed2a3a9bf4f4f86e9b324674e4207 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0326-1301 1851-9636 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T10:24:34Z |
| publishDate | 1999-05-01 |
| publisher | Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Análisis Filosófico |
| spelling | doaj.art-50bed2a3a9bf4f4f86e9b324674e42072023-11-15T20:14:58ZengSociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF)Análisis Filosófico0326-13011851-96361999-05-011914763https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e580Wittgenstein: significado y representacionesLiza Skidelsky0Universidad de Buenos AiresIn this paper I claim that although second Wittgenstein's conception of meaning has been thought asan attack to thc notion ofrepresentation, i! is compatible with this notion as it is meant in cognitive science. In order to show this, first, 1 reconstruct Wittgenstein's thesis. Second, I detach the representational thesis from the intemalist and epistemological ones. Then I show that the opponents of the wittgensteinian conception of meaning are the last two thesis.https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/580/420 |
| spellingShingle | Liza Skidelsky Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones Análisis Filosófico |
| title | Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones |
| title_full | Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones |
| title_fullStr | Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones |
| title_full_unstemmed | Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones |
| title_short | Wittgenstein: significado y representaciones |
| title_sort | wittgenstein significado y representaciones |
| url | https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/580/420 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lizaskidelsky wittgensteinsignificadoyrepresentaciones |