Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein
Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is n...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MULPress
2017-09-01
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| Series: | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3009 |
| _version_ | 1819181782414655488 |
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| author | Daniel Boyd |
| author_facet | Daniel Boyd |
| author_sort | Daniel Boyd |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T22:35:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-50ccd34b0abc49a9a998debb9d74a723 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2159-0303 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T22:35:42Z |
| publishDate | 2017-09-01 |
| publisher | MULPress |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-50ccd34b0abc49a9a998debb9d74a7232022-12-21T18:10:19ZengMULPressJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy2159-03032017-09-015910.15173/jhap.v5i9.3009Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s WittgensteinDaniel Boyd0CUNY Graduate CenterKripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained.https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3009 |
| spellingShingle | Daniel Boyd Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| title | Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein |
| title_full | Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein |
| title_fullStr | Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein |
| title_full_unstemmed | Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein |
| title_short | Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein |
| title_sort | semantic non factualism in kripke s wittgenstein |
| url | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3009 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT danielboyd semanticnonfactualisminkripkeswittgenstein |