Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein
Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is n...
Main Author: | Daniel Boyd |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MULPress
2017-09-01
|
Series: | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
Online Access: | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3009 |
Similar Items
-
Kripke’s Wittgenstein and Semantic Factualism
by: Miloš Šumonja
Published: (2021-03-01) -
Kripke’s Wittgenstein, factualism and meaning
by: Alexander Miller, et al.
Published: (2015-01-01) -
A Critical Review of the Mainstream Reading of Kripke’s Wittgenstein: οn Misunderstanding Kripke’s Wittgenstein
by: Ali Hosseinkhani
Published: (2023-11-01) -
A Criticism of Kripke’s Semantic for Intuitionistic Logic
by: Wagner de Campos Sanz
Published: (2016-12-01) -
Kripke Semantics for Martin-L\"of's Extensional Type Theory
by: Steve Awodey, et al.
Published: (2011-09-01)