Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions
Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one’s own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that contr...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2014-08-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fevo.2014.00041/full |
| _version_ | 1818423102579671040 |
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| author | Miguel edos Santos Victoria A. Braithwaite Victoria A. Braithwaite Claus eWedekind Claus eWedekind |
| author_facet | Miguel edos Santos Victoria A. Braithwaite Victoria A. Braithwaite Claus eWedekind Claus eWedekind |
| author_sort | Miguel edos Santos |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one’s own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-14T13:36:49Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-50cce36ab7904d659e96b2602907fe55 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-701X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-14T13:36:49Z |
| publishDate | 2014-08-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution |
| spelling | doaj.art-50cce36ab7904d659e96b2602907fe552022-12-21T22:59:34ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution2296-701X2014-08-01210.3389/fevo.2014.00041100719Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactionsMiguel edos Santos0Victoria A. Braithwaite1Victoria A. Braithwaite2Claus eWedekind3Claus eWedekind4University of LausanneThe Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity of EdinburghUniversity of LausanneUniversity of EdinburghHuman cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one’s own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fevo.2014.00041/fullGame theoryworking memorycooperationHelping BehaviorIndirect reciprocityexperimental games |
| spellingShingle | Miguel edos Santos Victoria A. Braithwaite Victoria A. Braithwaite Claus eWedekind Claus eWedekind Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Game theory working memory cooperation Helping Behavior Indirect reciprocity experimental games |
| title | Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions |
| title_full | Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions |
| title_fullStr | Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions |
| title_short | Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions |
| title_sort | exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation based interactions |
| topic | Game theory working memory cooperation Helping Behavior Indirect reciprocity experimental games |
| url | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fevo.2014.00041/full |
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