GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability
To address phasor measurement unit (PMU) vulnerability to spoofing, we propose the use of a set-valued state estimation technique known as stochastic reachability (SR)-based distributed Kalman filter (DKF) that computes secure global positioning system (GPS) timing across a network of receivers. Uti...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institute of Navigation
2023-07-01
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| Series: | Navigation |
| Online Access: | https://navi.ion.org/content/70/3/navi.574 |
| _version_ | 1797393323251466240 |
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| author | Sriramya Bhamidipati Grace Gao |
| author_facet | Sriramya Bhamidipati Grace Gao |
| author_sort | Sriramya Bhamidipati |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | To address phasor measurement unit (PMU) vulnerability to spoofing, we propose the use of a set-valued state estimation technique known as stochastic reachability (SR)-based distributed Kalman filter (DKF) that computes secure global positioning system (GPS) timing across a network of receivers. Utilizing SR, we estimate not only GPS time but also its stochastic reachable set, which is parameterized by probabilistic zonotope (p-Zonotope). While requiring known measurement error bounds in only non-spoofed conditions, we designed a two-tiered approach. We first performed measurement-level spoofing mitigation via deviation of a measurement innovation from its expected p-Zonotope. We then performed state-level timing risk analysis via a determination of the intersection probability of the estimated p-Zonotope with an unsafe set that violates IEEE C37.118.1a-2014 standards. Finally, we validated our SR-DKF algorithm by subjecting it to a simulated receiver network to coordinate signal-level spoofing. We demonstrate improved timing accuracy and successful spoofing mitigation via the use of our SR-DKF algorithm. We also validated the robustness of the estimated timing risk as the number of receivers were varied. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T00:01:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-51300a0fc5484d44bb22b104fd8afb1b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2161-4296 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T00:01:52Z |
| publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
| publisher | Institute of Navigation |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Navigation |
| spelling | doaj.art-51300a0fc5484d44bb22b104fd8afb1b2023-12-12T17:32:42ZengInstitute of NavigationNavigation2161-42962023-07-0170310.33012/navi.574navi.574GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic ReachabilitySriramya BhamidipatiGrace GaoTo address phasor measurement unit (PMU) vulnerability to spoofing, we propose the use of a set-valued state estimation technique known as stochastic reachability (SR)-based distributed Kalman filter (DKF) that computes secure global positioning system (GPS) timing across a network of receivers. Utilizing SR, we estimate not only GPS time but also its stochastic reachable set, which is parameterized by probabilistic zonotope (p-Zonotope). While requiring known measurement error bounds in only non-spoofed conditions, we designed a two-tiered approach. We first performed measurement-level spoofing mitigation via deviation of a measurement innovation from its expected p-Zonotope. We then performed state-level timing risk analysis via a determination of the intersection probability of the estimated p-Zonotope with an unsafe set that violates IEEE C37.118.1a-2014 standards. Finally, we validated our SR-DKF algorithm by subjecting it to a simulated receiver network to coordinate signal-level spoofing. We demonstrate improved timing accuracy and successful spoofing mitigation via the use of our SR-DKF algorithm. We also validated the robustness of the estimated timing risk as the number of receivers were varied.https://navi.ion.org/content/70/3/navi.574 |
| spellingShingle | Sriramya Bhamidipati Grace Gao GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability Navigation |
| title | GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability |
| title_full | GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability |
| title_fullStr | GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability |
| title_full_unstemmed | GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability |
| title_short | GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability |
| title_sort | gps spoofing mitigation and timing risk analysis in networked phasor measurement units via stochastic reachability |
| url | https://navi.ion.org/content/70/3/navi.574 |
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