Culture and freedom in transcendental and speculative idealism
The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert’s conception of culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2022-01-01
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Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2022/0353-57382202407K.pdf |
Summary: | The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and
especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as
a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert’s conception of
culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of
as a self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent). It leads to
transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of
transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the
subject it is presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values
and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly
within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as
a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The
origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived
of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a
subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its
world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a
manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute
ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are
both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships
emerging therefrom. |
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ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |