Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions?
IntroductionThe human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and ho...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2023-05-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866/full |
| _version_ | 1797826832870932480 |
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| author | Jacqueline Thompson Ben Teasdale Evert van Emde Boas Felix Budelmann Sophie Duncan Laurie Maguire Robin Dunbar |
| author_facet | Jacqueline Thompson Ben Teasdale Evert van Emde Boas Felix Budelmann Sophie Duncan Laurie Maguire Robin Dunbar |
| author_sort | Jacqueline Thompson |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | IntroductionThe human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and how they view the characters involved and their actions. It has been suggested that fiction provides us with a ‘fictive pass’ that allows us to evaluate in a more balanced, detached way the morality of a character’s behaviour.MethodsWe use a randomised controlled experimental design to test this.Results and discussionWe show that, although knowing whether a substantial film clip is fact or fiction does not affect how engaged with (‘transported’ by) a troubling story an observer becomes, it does grant them a ‘fictive pass’ to empathise with a moral transgressor. However, a fictive pass does not override the capacity to judge the causes of a character’s moral transgression (at least as indexed by a causal attribution task). |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-09T12:38:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-518e19dd7d0e4fe7b922439c7663a08d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-09T12:38:34Z |
| publishDate | 2023-05-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-518e19dd7d0e4fe7b922439c7663a08d2023-05-15T05:08:51ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782023-05-011410.3389/fpsyg.2023.11598661159866Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions?Jacqueline ThompsonBen TeasdaleEvert van Emde BoasFelix BudelmannSophie DuncanLaurie MaguireRobin DunbarIntroductionThe human capacity to engage with fictional worlds raises important psychological questions about the mechanisms that make this possible. Of particular interest is whether people respond differently to fictional stories compared to factual ones in terms of how immersed they become and how they view the characters involved and their actions. It has been suggested that fiction provides us with a ‘fictive pass’ that allows us to evaluate in a more balanced, detached way the morality of a character’s behaviour.MethodsWe use a randomised controlled experimental design to test this.Results and discussionWe show that, although knowing whether a substantial film clip is fact or fiction does not affect how engaged with (‘transported’ by) a troubling story an observer becomes, it does grant them a ‘fictive pass’ to empathise with a moral transgressor. However, a fictive pass does not override the capacity to judge the causes of a character’s moral transgression (at least as indexed by a causal attribution task).https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866/fullfictional transportationfictive passidentificationcausal attributionempathy |
| spellingShingle | Jacqueline Thompson Ben Teasdale Evert van Emde Boas Felix Budelmann Sophie Duncan Laurie Maguire Robin Dunbar Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions? Frontiers in Psychology fictional transportation fictive pass identification causal attribution empathy |
| title | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions? |
| title_full | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions? |
| title_fullStr | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions? |
| title_short | Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions? |
| title_sort | does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a fictive pass in understanding others actions |
| topic | fictional transportation fictive pass identification causal attribution empathy |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866/full |
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