Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns
Due to serious environmental pollution and waste of resources, the government advocates the development of a sustainable circular economy, and academia and manufacturing are gradually paying attention to the green closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, a green closed-loop supply chain consisting o...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
IEEE
2020-01-01
|
Series: | IEEE Access |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9296780/ |
_version_ | 1818917785979322368 |
---|---|
author | Nian Zhang Bin Li |
author_facet | Nian Zhang Bin Li |
author_sort | Nian Zhang |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Due to serious environmental pollution and waste of resources, the government advocates the development of a sustainable circular economy, and academia and manufacturing are gradually paying attention to the green closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, a green closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered. The manufacturer would cost a great deal to recycle waste products for remanufacturing while developing and producing green products, which may concern about the fairness of the profit distribution. Based on game theory, four different game scenarios are proposed, which are a centralized model and three decentralized models including manufacturer considering fairness neutrality, the retailer considering manufacturer's fairness concerns and the retailer ignoring manufacturer's fairness concerns. This paper compares and analyzes the optimal decision-making of the manufacturer and retailer in different scenarios, discusses the impact of manufacturer's fairness concerns on various decision variables, the profits of supply chain members and the overall profits, and then studies the effect of green efficiency on green closed-loop supply. The results show that this behavior would cause less damage to the green closed-loop supply chain and is more conducive to ensuring the environmental quality of green products, recycling and reuse of waste products and consumer rights when the retailer considers the manufacturer's fairness concerns behavior. By designing a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, it can effectively achieve the Pareto improvement of the green closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-20T00:39:36Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-51fa41133434453f8f3c30a9f852bf64 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2169-3536 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-20T00:39:36Z |
publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
publisher | IEEE |
record_format | Article |
series | IEEE Access |
spelling | doaj.art-51fa41133434453f8f3c30a9f852bf642022-12-21T19:59:38ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362020-01-01822417822418910.1109/ACCESS.2020.30451529296780Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness ConcernsNian Zhang0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2631-7108Bin Li1Chongqing Smart Post Engineering Technology Research Center, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing, ChinaChongqing Smart Post Engineering Technology Research Center, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing, ChinaDue to serious environmental pollution and waste of resources, the government advocates the development of a sustainable circular economy, and academia and manufacturing are gradually paying attention to the green closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, a green closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered. The manufacturer would cost a great deal to recycle waste products for remanufacturing while developing and producing green products, which may concern about the fairness of the profit distribution. Based on game theory, four different game scenarios are proposed, which are a centralized model and three decentralized models including manufacturer considering fairness neutrality, the retailer considering manufacturer's fairness concerns and the retailer ignoring manufacturer's fairness concerns. This paper compares and analyzes the optimal decision-making of the manufacturer and retailer in different scenarios, discusses the impact of manufacturer's fairness concerns on various decision variables, the profits of supply chain members and the overall profits, and then studies the effect of green efficiency on green closed-loop supply. The results show that this behavior would cause less damage to the green closed-loop supply chain and is more conducive to ensuring the environmental quality of green products, recycling and reuse of waste products and consumer rights when the retailer considers the manufacturer's fairness concerns behavior. By designing a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, it can effectively achieve the Pareto improvement of the green closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9296780/Fairness concernsdecision-makinggreen closed-loop supply chainrevenue-sharing contract |
spellingShingle | Nian Zhang Bin Li Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns IEEE Access Fairness concerns decision-making green closed-loop supply chain revenue-sharing contract |
title | Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns |
title_full | Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns |
title_fullStr | Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns |
title_full_unstemmed | Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns |
title_short | Pricing and Coordination of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns |
title_sort | pricing and coordination of green closed loop supply chain with fairness concerns |
topic | Fairness concerns decision-making green closed-loop supply chain revenue-sharing contract |
url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9296780/ |
work_keys_str_mv | AT nianzhang pricingandcoordinationofgreenclosedloopsupplychainwithfairnessconcerns AT binli pricingandcoordinationofgreenclosedloopsupplychainwithfairnessconcerns |