Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game
In the present study EEG was recorded simultaneously while two participants were playing the three-person Ultimatum Game. Both participants received different offers from changing proposers about how to split up a certain amount of money between the three players. One of the participants had no say,...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2013-06-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00312/full |
| _version_ | 1828852301109919744 |
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| author | Johanna eAlexopoulos Daniela Melitta Pfabigan Florian eGöschl Herbert eBauer Florian Ph.S Fischmeister |
| author_facet | Johanna eAlexopoulos Daniela Melitta Pfabigan Florian eGöschl Herbert eBauer Florian Ph.S Fischmeister |
| author_sort | Johanna eAlexopoulos |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the present study EEG was recorded simultaneously while two participants were playing the three-person Ultimatum Game. Both participants received different offers from changing proposers about how to split up a certain amount of money between the three players. One of the participants had no say, whereas the other, the responder, was able to harm the payoff of all other players. The aim of the study was to investigate how the outcomes of the respective other are evaluated by participants who were treated fairly or unfairly themselves and to what extent agency influences concerns for fairness. Analyses were focused on the medial frontal negativity (MFN) as an early index for subjective value assignment. Recipients with veto-power exhibited enhanced, more negative-going, MFN amplitudes following proposals that comprised a low share for both recipients, suggesting that responders favored offers with a fair amount to at least one of the two players. Though, the powerless players cared about the amount assigned to the responder, MFN amplitudes were larger following fair compared to unfair offers assigned to the responder. Similarly, concerns for fairness which determined the amplitude of the MFN, suggested that the powerless players exhibited negative and conversely the responders, positive social preferences. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T23:50:28Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-524c4f9c2fa94fc38874fef918dd543d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1662-5161 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T23:50:28Z |
| publishDate | 2013-06-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |
| spelling | doaj.art-524c4f9c2fa94fc38874fef918dd543d2022-12-22T00:06:43ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience1662-51612013-06-01710.3389/fnhum.2013.0031254007Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum gameJohanna eAlexopoulos0Daniela Melitta Pfabigan1Florian eGöschl2Herbert eBauer3Florian Ph.S Fischmeister4Medical University of ViennaUniversity of ViennaUniversity Medical Center Hamburg-EppendorfUniversity of ViennaMedical University of ViennaIn the present study EEG was recorded simultaneously while two participants were playing the three-person Ultimatum Game. Both participants received different offers from changing proposers about how to split up a certain amount of money between the three players. One of the participants had no say, whereas the other, the responder, was able to harm the payoff of all other players. The aim of the study was to investigate how the outcomes of the respective other are evaluated by participants who were treated fairly or unfairly themselves and to what extent agency influences concerns for fairness. Analyses were focused on the medial frontal negativity (MFN) as an early index for subjective value assignment. Recipients with veto-power exhibited enhanced, more negative-going, MFN amplitudes following proposals that comprised a low share for both recipients, suggesting that responders favored offers with a fair amount to at least one of the two players. Though, the powerless players cared about the amount assigned to the responder, MFN amplitudes were larger following fair compared to unfair offers assigned to the responder. Similarly, concerns for fairness which determined the amplitude of the MFN, suggested that the powerless players exhibited negative and conversely the responders, positive social preferences.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00312/fullultimatum gamesocial preferencesAltruismMFNspite |
| spellingShingle | Johanna eAlexopoulos Daniela Melitta Pfabigan Florian eGöschl Herbert eBauer Florian Ph.S Fischmeister Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game Frontiers in Human Neuroscience ultimatum game social preferences Altruism MFN spite |
| title | Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game |
| title_full | Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game |
| title_fullStr | Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game |
| title_short | Agency matters! Social preferences in the three-person ultimatum game |
| title_sort | agency matters social preferences in the three person ultimatum game |
| topic | ultimatum game social preferences Altruism MFN spite |
| url | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00312/full |
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