Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games

We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowme...

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Main Authors: Dirk Engelmann, Martin Strobel
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2010-10-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/4/459/
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author Dirk Engelmann
Martin Strobel
author_facet Dirk Engelmann
Martin Strobel
author_sort Dirk Engelmann
collection DOAJ
description We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices.
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spelling doaj.art-53d8543577c240f19a603346452ff5e62022-12-22T02:38:16ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362010-10-011445947710.3390/g1040459Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting GamesDirk EngelmannMartin StrobelWe study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/4/459/reciprocityinequality aversionaltruismmoonlighting game
spellingShingle Dirk Engelmann
Martin Strobel
Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
Games
reciprocity
inequality aversion
altruism
moonlighting game
title Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
title_full Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
title_fullStr Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
title_full_unstemmed Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
title_short Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
title_sort inequality aversion and reciprocity in moonlighting games
topic reciprocity
inequality aversion
altruism
moonlighting game
url http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/4/459/
work_keys_str_mv AT dirkengelmann inequalityaversionandreciprocityinmoonlightinggames
AT martinstrobel inequalityaversionandreciprocityinmoonlightinggames