Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action
For a very long time, theorizing in the cognitive sciences was dominated by the assumption that abstract concepts, which lack a perceivable referent, can only be handled by amodal or verbal linguistic representations. In the last years, however, refined grounded cognition theories emphasizing the im...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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De Gruyter
2020-07-01
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| Series: | Open Psychology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/psych-2020-0104 |
| _version_ | 1818695636300595200 |
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| author | Kiefer Markus Harpaintner Marcel |
| author_facet | Kiefer Markus Harpaintner Marcel |
| author_sort | Kiefer Markus |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | For a very long time, theorizing in the cognitive sciences was dominated by the assumption that abstract concepts, which lack a perceivable referent, can only be handled by amodal or verbal linguistic representations. In the last years, however, refined grounded cognition theories emphasizing the importance of emotional and introspective information for abstract concepts, in addition to verbal associations and sensorimotor information, have received increasing support. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the structure and neural basis of conceptual memory and evaluate them in light of recent empirical evidence with regard to the processing of concrete and abstract concepts. Based on this literature review, we argue that abstract concepts should not be treated as a homogenous conceptual category, whose meaning is established by one single specific type of representation. Instead, depending on the feature composition, there are different subgroups of abstract concepts, including those with strong relations to vision or action, which are represented in the visual and motor brain systems similar to concrete concepts. The reviewed findings with regard to concrete and abstract concepts can be accommodated best by hybrid theories of conceptual representation assuming an interaction between modality-specific, multimodal and amodal hub areas. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-17T13:48:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-543acd700cc346a0a50459f558e347bb |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2543-8883 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-17T13:48:37Z |
| publishDate | 2020-07-01 |
| publisher | De Gruyter |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Open Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-543acd700cc346a0a50459f558e347bb2022-12-21T21:46:07ZengDe GruyterOpen Psychology2543-88832020-07-012111913710.1515/psych-2020-0104psych-2020-0104Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or actionKiefer Markus0Harpaintner Marcel1University of Ulm, Department of Psychiatry, Section for Cognitive Electrophysiology, Leimgrubenweg 12, 89075Ulm, GermanyUniversity of Ulm, Department of Psychiatry, Section for Cognitive Electrophysiology, Leimgrubenweg 12, 89075Ulm, GermanyFor a very long time, theorizing in the cognitive sciences was dominated by the assumption that abstract concepts, which lack a perceivable referent, can only be handled by amodal or verbal linguistic representations. In the last years, however, refined grounded cognition theories emphasizing the importance of emotional and introspective information for abstract concepts, in addition to verbal associations and sensorimotor information, have received increasing support. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the structure and neural basis of conceptual memory and evaluate them in light of recent empirical evidence with regard to the processing of concrete and abstract concepts. Based on this literature review, we argue that abstract concepts should not be treated as a homogenous conceptual category, whose meaning is established by one single specific type of representation. Instead, depending on the feature composition, there are different subgroups of abstract concepts, including those with strong relations to vision or action, which are represented in the visual and motor brain systems similar to concrete concepts. The reviewed findings with regard to concrete and abstract concepts can be accommodated best by hybrid theories of conceptual representation assuming an interaction between modality-specific, multimodal and amodal hub areas.https://doi.org/10.1515/psych-2020-0104semantic memorylanguagegrounded cognitionabstract concepts |
| spellingShingle | Kiefer Markus Harpaintner Marcel Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action Open Psychology semantic memory language grounded cognition abstract concepts |
| title | Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action |
| title_full | Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action |
| title_fullStr | Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action |
| title_full_unstemmed | Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action |
| title_short | Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action |
| title_sort | varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action |
| topic | semantic memory language grounded cognition abstract concepts |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/psych-2020-0104 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kiefermarkus varietiesofabstractconceptsandtheirgroundinginperceptionoraction AT harpaintnermarcel varietiesofabstractconceptsandtheirgroundinginperceptionoraction |