Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences
In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics – fundamental essentialism – according to which individuals just are realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic conting...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Vilnius University Press
2022-10-01
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| Series: | Problemos |
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| Online Access: | https://www.journals.vu.lt/problemos/article/view/29557 |
| _version_ | 1797990642959253504 |
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| author | Pranciškus Gricius |
| author_facet | Pranciškus Gricius |
| author_sort | Pranciškus Gricius |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics – fundamental essentialism – according to which individuals just are realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic contingentists propositions are true require possible worlds whose domain contain merely possible individuals. In light of this problem, Plantinga has developed modal metaphysics based on essences, but it has been claimed by Fine, Williamson, and others, that it cannot be upheld because of the problem of unexemplified essences. We answer the latter problem by claiming that individuals just are realized essences. Then, justifying our theory further we refute Williamson’s deductive argument for necessitism. Afterward, we show in what sense fundamental essentialism is contingentist metaphysics.
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| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T08:39:44Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5470750eb2a34f3fa930e4f9e21f7e39 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1392-1126 2424-6158 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T08:39:44Z |
| publishDate | 2022-10-01 |
| publisher | Vilnius University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Problemos |
| spelling | doaj.art-5470750eb2a34f3fa930e4f9e21f7e392022-12-22T04:34:14ZengVilnius University PressProblemos1392-11262424-61582022-10-0110210.15388/Problemos.2022.102.3Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized EssencesPranciškus Gricius0Vilnius University, Lithuania In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics – fundamental essentialism – according to which individuals just are realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic contingentists propositions are true require possible worlds whose domain contain merely possible individuals. In light of this problem, Plantinga has developed modal metaphysics based on essences, but it has been claimed by Fine, Williamson, and others, that it cannot be upheld because of the problem of unexemplified essences. We answer the latter problem by claiming that individuals just are realized essences. Then, justifying our theory further we refute Williamson’s deductive argument for necessitism. Afterward, we show in what sense fundamental essentialism is contingentist metaphysics. https://www.journals.vu.lt/problemos/article/view/29557ContingentismActualismPossible Worlds SemanticsUnexemplified EssencesNecessitism |
| spellingShingle | Pranciškus Gricius Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences Problemos Contingentism Actualism Possible Worlds Semantics Unexemplified Essences Necessitism |
| title | Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences |
| title_full | Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences |
| title_fullStr | Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences |
| title_full_unstemmed | Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences |
| title_short | Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences |
| title_sort | toward a new theory of moderate contingentism individuals just are realized essences |
| topic | Contingentism Actualism Possible Worlds Semantics Unexemplified Essences Necessitism |
| url | https://www.journals.vu.lt/problemos/article/view/29557 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pranciskusgricius towardanewtheoryofmoderatecontingentismindividualsjustarerealizedessences |