Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation
Solar geoengineering is the deliberate reduction in the absorption of incoming solar radiation by the Earth’s climate system with the aim of reducing impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Climate model simulations project a diversity of regional outcomes that vary with the amount of solar geoengi...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2013-01-01
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| Series: | Environmental Research Letters |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021 |
| _version_ | 1797748421294030848 |
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| author | Katharine L Ricke Juan B Moreno-Cruz Ken Caldeira |
| author_facet | Katharine L Ricke Juan B Moreno-Cruz Ken Caldeira |
| author_sort | Katharine L Ricke |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Solar geoengineering is the deliberate reduction in the absorption of incoming solar radiation by the Earth’s climate system with the aim of reducing impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Climate model simulations project a diversity of regional outcomes that vary with the amount of solar geoengineering deployed. It is unlikely that a single small actor could implement and sustain global-scale geoengineering that harms much of the world without intervention from harmed world powers. However, a sufficiently powerful international coalition might be able to deploy solar geoengineering. Here, we show that regional differences in climate outcomes create strategic incentives to form coalitions that are as small as possible, while still powerful enough to deploy solar geoengineering. The characteristics of coalitions to geoengineer climate are modeled using a ‘global thermostat setting game’ based on climate model results. Coalition members have incentives to exclude non-members that would prevent implementation of solar geoengineering at a level that is optimal for the existing coalition. These incentives differ markedly from those that dominate international politics of greenhouse-gas emissions reduction, where the central challenge is to compel free riders to participate. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:05:30Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-54a0a98db0214a2e94b2ab723db9a31a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1748-9326 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:05:30Z |
| publishDate | 2013-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Environmental Research Letters |
| spelling | doaj.art-54a0a98db0214a2e94b2ab723db9a31a2023-08-09T14:24:04ZengIOP PublishingEnvironmental Research Letters1748-93262013-01-018101402110.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participationKatharine L Ricke0Juan B Moreno-Cruz1Ken Caldeira2Department of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution for Science , Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305, USASchool of Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology , Atlanta, GA 30332, USADepartment of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution for Science , Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305, USASolar geoengineering is the deliberate reduction in the absorption of incoming solar radiation by the Earth’s climate system with the aim of reducing impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Climate model simulations project a diversity of regional outcomes that vary with the amount of solar geoengineering deployed. It is unlikely that a single small actor could implement and sustain global-scale geoengineering that harms much of the world without intervention from harmed world powers. However, a sufficiently powerful international coalition might be able to deploy solar geoengineering. Here, we show that regional differences in climate outcomes create strategic incentives to form coalitions that are as small as possible, while still powerful enough to deploy solar geoengineering. The characteristics of coalitions to geoengineer climate are modeled using a ‘global thermostat setting game’ based on climate model results. Coalition members have incentives to exclude non-members that would prevent implementation of solar geoengineering at a level that is optimal for the existing coalition. These incentives differ markedly from those that dominate international politics of greenhouse-gas emissions reduction, where the central challenge is to compel free riders to participate.https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021geoengineeringinternational environmental agreementsgame theoryclimate modelingclimate coalitions |
| spellingShingle | Katharine L Ricke Juan B Moreno-Cruz Ken Caldeira Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation Environmental Research Letters geoengineering international environmental agreements game theory climate modeling climate coalitions |
| title | Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation |
| title_full | Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation |
| title_fullStr | Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation |
| title_short | Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation |
| title_sort | strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation |
| topic | geoengineering international environmental agreements game theory climate modeling climate coalitions |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021 |
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