The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas
In two comprehensive and fully incentivized studies, we investigate the development of ingroup favoritism as one of two aspects of parochial altruism in repeated social dilemmas. Specifically, we test whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed phenomenon that can be observed from the very beginning and r...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2015-04-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
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| Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00476/full |
| _version_ | 1819263186551963648 |
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| author | Angela Rachael Dorrough Angela Rachael Dorrough Andreas eGlöckner Andreas eGlöckner Dshamilja Marie Hellmann Irena eEbert |
| author_facet | Angela Rachael Dorrough Angela Rachael Dorrough Andreas eGlöckner Andreas eGlöckner Dshamilja Marie Hellmann Irena eEbert |
| author_sort | Angela Rachael Dorrough |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In two comprehensive and fully incentivized studies, we investigate the development of ingroup favoritism as one of two aspects of parochial altruism in repeated social dilemmas. Specifically, we test whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed phenomenon that can be observed from the very beginning and remains stable over time, or whether it develops (increases vs. decreases) during repeated contact. Ingroup favoritism is assessed through cooperation behavior in a repeated continuous prisoner’s dilemma where participants sequentially interact with ten members of the ingroup (own city and university) and subsequently with ten members of the outgroup (other city and university), or vice versa. In none of the experiments do we observe initial differences in cooperation behavior for interaction partners from the ingroup, as compared to outgroup, and we only observe small differences in expectations regarding the interaction partners’ cooperation behavior. After repeated interaction, however, including a change of groups, clear ingroup favoritism can be observed. Instead of being due to gradual and potentially biased updating of expectations, we found that these emerging differences were mainly driven by the change of interaction partners’ group membership that occurred after round 10. This indicates that in social dilemma settings ingroup favoritism is to some degree dynamic in that it is enhanced and sometimes only observable if group membership is activated by thinking about both the interaction with the ingroup and the outgroup. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-23T20:09:35Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-552af60625034abe97b9fa38d8ac72d9 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-23T20:09:35Z |
| publishDate | 2015-04-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-552af60625034abe97b9fa38d8ac72d92022-12-21T17:32:50ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782015-04-01610.3389/fpsyg.2015.00476133088The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmasAngela Rachael Dorrough0Angela Rachael Dorrough1Andreas eGlöckner2Andreas eGlöckner3Dshamilja Marie Hellmann4Irena eEbert5Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsUniversity of SiegenUniversity of GöttingenMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsUniversity of Koblenz-LandauIn two comprehensive and fully incentivized studies, we investigate the development of ingroup favoritism as one of two aspects of parochial altruism in repeated social dilemmas. Specifically, we test whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed phenomenon that can be observed from the very beginning and remains stable over time, or whether it develops (increases vs. decreases) during repeated contact. Ingroup favoritism is assessed through cooperation behavior in a repeated continuous prisoner’s dilemma where participants sequentially interact with ten members of the ingroup (own city and university) and subsequently with ten members of the outgroup (other city and university), or vice versa. In none of the experiments do we observe initial differences in cooperation behavior for interaction partners from the ingroup, as compared to outgroup, and we only observe small differences in expectations regarding the interaction partners’ cooperation behavior. After repeated interaction, however, including a change of groups, clear ingroup favoritism can be observed. Instead of being due to gradual and potentially biased updating of expectations, we found that these emerging differences were mainly driven by the change of interaction partners’ group membership that occurred after round 10. This indicates that in social dilemma settings ingroup favoritism is to some degree dynamic in that it is enhanced and sometimes only observable if group membership is activated by thinking about both the interaction with the ingroup and the outgroup.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00476/fullIntergroup ContactSocial dilemmasSocial identityprisoner’s dilemmaIngroup favoritism |
| spellingShingle | Angela Rachael Dorrough Angela Rachael Dorrough Andreas eGlöckner Andreas eGlöckner Dshamilja Marie Hellmann Irena eEbert The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas Frontiers in Psychology Intergroup Contact Social dilemmas Social identity prisoner’s dilemma Ingroup favoritism |
| title | The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas |
| title_full | The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas |
| title_fullStr | The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas |
| title_full_unstemmed | The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas |
| title_short | The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas |
| title_sort | development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas |
| topic | Intergroup Contact Social dilemmas Social identity prisoner’s dilemma Ingroup favoritism |
| url | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00476/full |
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