Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias

We demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Base...

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Main Authors: J. Edward Russo, Jonathan C. Corbin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2016-09-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15802/jdm15802.pdf
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author J. Edward Russo
Jonathan C. Corbin
author_facet J. Edward Russo
Jonathan C. Corbin
author_sort J. Edward Russo
collection DOAJ
description We demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Baseball games and a recently devised method for priming the consistency goal. When preference is the first response, priming cognitive consistency moves prediction toward greater agreement with that preference, thereby increasing the desirability bias. In contrast, when prediction is the first response, priming cognitive consistency facilitates greater agreement with the factual information for each game. This increases the accuracy of the prediction and reduces the desirability bias.
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spelling doaj.art-556d20eedb6a4c5394ef305a1cdf9bdb2023-08-02T03:37:30ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752016-09-01115449459Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability biasJ. Edward RussoJonathan C. CorbinWe demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Baseball games and a recently devised method for priming the consistency goal. When preference is the first response, priming cognitive consistency moves prediction toward greater agreement with that preference, thereby increasing the desirability bias. In contrast, when prediction is the first response, priming cognitive consistency facilitates greater agreement with the factual information for each game. This increases the accuracy of the prediction and reduces the desirability bias.http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15802/jdm15802.pdfcognitive consistency desirability bias goals priming wishful thinkingNAKeywords
spellingShingle J. Edward Russo
Jonathan C. Corbin
Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
Judgment and Decision Making
cognitive consistency
desirability bias
goals
priming
wishful thinkingNAKeywords
title Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
title_full Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
title_fullStr Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
title_full_unstemmed Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
title_short Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
title_sort not by desire alone the role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
topic cognitive consistency
desirability bias
goals
priming
wishful thinkingNAKeywords
url http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15802/jdm15802.pdf
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