Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity
This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same...
Main Authors: | Doruk İriş, Luís Santos-Pinto |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2013-02-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/1/50 |
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