Learning to Set the Reserve Price Optimally in Laboratory First Price Auctions
We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was consistent...
Main Authors: | Priyodorshi Banerjee, Shashwat Khare, P. Srikant |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2018-10-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/79 |
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