On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020)
The CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2020-11-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/20/200813/jdm200813.pdf |
| _version_ | 1827834682989871104 |
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| author | Bertram Gawronski Paul Conway Mandy Hütter Dillon M. Luke Joel Armstrong Rebecca Friesdorf |
| author_facet | Bertram Gawronski Paul Conway Mandy Hütter Dillon M. Luke Joel Armstrong Rebecca Friesdorf |
| author_sort | Bertram Gawronski |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The CNI model of
moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to
consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for
inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of
the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for
research using the CNI model, and the robustness of findings obtained with the
CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020)
dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments.
Here, we respond to their critique, showing that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal
of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the
model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and
explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with
empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent
findings resulting from changes in model specifications, although the reported
reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI
model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and
Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of
the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of
individual dilemmas, the available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a
valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights into
the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of
the traditional approach that pits moral norms against consequences for the
greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma). |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T05:55:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-58361d5e33534091b1fa33d1c7ac2a89 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T05:55:23Z |
| publishDate | 2020-11-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-58361d5e33534091b1fa33d1c7ac2a892023-09-03T04:35:59ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752020-11-0115610541072On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020)Bertram GawronskiPaul ConwayMandy HütterDillon M. LukeJoel ArmstrongRebecca FriesdorfThe CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model, and the robustness of findings obtained with the CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020) dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments. Here, we respond to their critique, showing that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings resulting from changes in model specifications, although the reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of individual dilemmas, the available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach that pits moral norms against consequences for the greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma).http://journal.sjdm.org/20/200813/jdm200813.pdfcni model; deontology; moral dilemmas; moral judgment; multinomial modeling; omission bias; utilitarianism nakeywords |
| spellingShingle | Bertram Gawronski Paul Conway Mandy Hütter Dillon M. Luke Joel Armstrong Rebecca Friesdorf On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020) Judgment and Decision Making cni model; deontology; moral dilemmas; moral judgment; multinomial modeling; omission bias; utilitarianism nakeywords |
| title | On
the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and
Goodwin (2020) |
| title_full | On
the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and
Goodwin (2020) |
| title_fullStr | On
the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and
Goodwin (2020) |
| title_full_unstemmed | On
the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and
Goodwin (2020) |
| title_short | On
the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and
Goodwin (2020) |
| title_sort | on the validity of the cni model of moral decision making reply to baron and goodwin 2020 |
| topic | cni model; deontology; moral dilemmas; moral judgment; multinomial modeling; omission bias; utilitarianism nakeywords |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/20/200813/jdm200813.pdf |
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