Cooperation in costly-access environments
Understanding cooperative behavior in biological and social systems constitutes a scientific challenge, being the object of intense research over the past decades. Many mechanisms have been proposed to explain the presence and persistence of cooperation in those systems, showing that there is no uni...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2022-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ac7b9d |
| _version_ | 1797748355546218496 |
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| author | Hugo Pérez-Martínez Carlos Gracia-Lázaro Fabio Dercole Yamir Moreno |
| author_facet | Hugo Pérez-Martínez Carlos Gracia-Lázaro Fabio Dercole Yamir Moreno |
| author_sort | Hugo Pérez-Martínez |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Understanding cooperative behavior in biological and social systems constitutes a scientific challenge, being the object of intense research over the past decades. Many mechanisms have been proposed to explain the presence and persistence of cooperation in those systems, showing that there is no unique explanation, as different scenarios have different possible driving forces. In this paper, we propose a model to study situations in which voluntary participation involves an access cost to the cooperative interaction, besides the cost associated with cooperation. The proposed costly-access prisoner’s dilemma (PD), a symmetric donation game with voluntary and costly participation, breaks the symmetry between abstainers and participants of the voluntary PD. A mean-field approach shows that, in well-mixed populations, the dynamic always leads the system to abstention. However, depending on the return parameter, numerical simulations in structured populations display an alternating behavior between mono-strategic, multi-stable, and coexistence phases. This behavior is fully explained through a theoretical analysis of the strategic motifs, the transitions being determined by the change in stability of those motifs. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:04:31Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-599280446a9341e2804929c668a84a0f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:04:31Z |
| publishDate | 2022-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-599280446a9341e2804929c668a84a0f2023-08-09T14:25:59ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302022-01-0124808300510.1088/1367-2630/ac7b9dCooperation in costly-access environmentsHugo Pérez-Martínez0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5959-6724Carlos Gracia-Lázaro1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9769-8796Fabio Dercole2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9256-0651Yamir Moreno3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0895-1893Department of Condensed Matter Physics, University of Zaragoza , 50009, Zaragoza, Spain; Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza , 50018, Zaragoza, SpainInstitute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza , 50018, Zaragoza, SpainDepartment of Electronics, Information, and Bioengineering, Politecnico di Milano , 20133, Milano, ItalyInstitute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza , 50018, Zaragoza, Spain; Department of Theoretical Physics, University of Zaragoza , 50005, Zaragoza, Spain; ISI Foundation , Turin, ItalyUnderstanding cooperative behavior in biological and social systems constitutes a scientific challenge, being the object of intense research over the past decades. Many mechanisms have been proposed to explain the presence and persistence of cooperation in those systems, showing that there is no unique explanation, as different scenarios have different possible driving forces. In this paper, we propose a model to study situations in which voluntary participation involves an access cost to the cooperative interaction, besides the cost associated with cooperation. The proposed costly-access prisoner’s dilemma (PD), a symmetric donation game with voluntary and costly participation, breaks the symmetry between abstainers and participants of the voluntary PD. A mean-field approach shows that, in well-mixed populations, the dynamic always leads the system to abstention. However, depending on the return parameter, numerical simulations in structured populations display an alternating behavior between mono-strategic, multi-stable, and coexistence phases. This behavior is fully explained through a theoretical analysis of the strategic motifs, the transitions being determined by the change in stability of those motifs.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ac7b9dcooperationevolutionary game theorycomplex systemssocial dilemmas |
| spellingShingle | Hugo Pérez-Martínez Carlos Gracia-Lázaro Fabio Dercole Yamir Moreno Cooperation in costly-access environments New Journal of Physics cooperation evolutionary game theory complex systems social dilemmas |
| title | Cooperation in costly-access environments |
| title_full | Cooperation in costly-access environments |
| title_fullStr | Cooperation in costly-access environments |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperation in costly-access environments |
| title_short | Cooperation in costly-access environments |
| title_sort | cooperation in costly access environments |
| topic | cooperation evolutionary game theory complex systems social dilemmas |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ac7b9d |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hugoperezmartinez cooperationincostlyaccessenvironments AT carlosgracialazaro cooperationincostlyaccessenvironments AT fabiodercole cooperationincostlyaccessenvironments AT yamirmoreno cooperationincostlyaccessenvironments |