Defending the Free Will Defense: A Reply to Sterba
James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2022-11-01
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| Series: | Religions |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/11/1126 |
| Summary: | James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |