Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development
Abstract Corruption and anti-corruption efforts are intertwined with political and economic concerns. From an economic and political perspective, as the government strives to enhance its governance capabilities, it becomes crucial to consider the costs of anti-corruption supervision and the losses i...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Nature
2023-07-01
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| Series: | Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01930-5 |
| _version_ | 1797774279276756992 |
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| author | Miao Zhang Houli Zhang Li Zhang Xu Peng Jiaxuan Zhu Duochenxi Liu Shibing You |
| author_facet | Miao Zhang Houli Zhang Li Zhang Xu Peng Jiaxuan Zhu Duochenxi Liu Shibing You |
| author_sort | Miao Zhang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Corruption and anti-corruption efforts are intertwined with political and economic concerns. From an economic and political perspective, as the government strives to enhance its governance capabilities, it becomes crucial to consider the costs of anti-corruption supervision and the losses incurred from corruption. This evaluation is essential for formulating a scientifically sound anti-corruption strategy that maximizes government benefits. To address this issue, the paper presents a model that incorporates levels of supervision and associated costs. The findings reveal that in the case of homogeneous officials, the optimal level of supervisory input, which maximizes government benefit, is nearly zero when per capita income is low due to budgetary constraints on anti-corruption control. However, as per capita income reaches a certain threshold, the optimal level of supervisory input suddenly rises to its maximum and decreases as per capita income increases. Alternatively, if the government adopts a zero-tolerance approach towards corruption and provides adequate remuneration to its employees, ensuring that all competent authorities can resist corruption, then corruption can be eliminated. Moreover, when officials exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their honesty levels, certain conditions give rise to a middle per capita income range, resulting in an optimal level of supervisory input that leads to a phenomenon known as “partial corruption.” During this phase, the wages paid by the government to its employees promote honesty, preventing them from engaging in corruption. However, they are unable to curb the corrupt activities of more dishonest officials. To some extent, this model also explains the challenges associated with eradicating corruption in several middle-income countries. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T22:18:44Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-59c7e3f27bcc4a93be3999d0a218f731 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2662-9992 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T22:18:44Z |
| publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
| publisher | Springer Nature |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| spelling | doaj.art-59c7e3f27bcc4a93be3999d0a218f7312023-07-23T11:09:29ZengSpringer NatureHumanities & Social Sciences Communications2662-99922023-07-0110111310.1057/s41599-023-01930-5Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic developmentMiao Zhang0Houli Zhang1Li Zhang2Xu Peng3Jiaxuan Zhu4Duochenxi Liu5Shibing You6School of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversitySchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversitySchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversitySchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversitySchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversitySchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversitySchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan UniversityAbstract Corruption and anti-corruption efforts are intertwined with political and economic concerns. From an economic and political perspective, as the government strives to enhance its governance capabilities, it becomes crucial to consider the costs of anti-corruption supervision and the losses incurred from corruption. This evaluation is essential for formulating a scientifically sound anti-corruption strategy that maximizes government benefits. To address this issue, the paper presents a model that incorporates levels of supervision and associated costs. The findings reveal that in the case of homogeneous officials, the optimal level of supervisory input, which maximizes government benefit, is nearly zero when per capita income is low due to budgetary constraints on anti-corruption control. However, as per capita income reaches a certain threshold, the optimal level of supervisory input suddenly rises to its maximum and decreases as per capita income increases. Alternatively, if the government adopts a zero-tolerance approach towards corruption and provides adequate remuneration to its employees, ensuring that all competent authorities can resist corruption, then corruption can be eliminated. Moreover, when officials exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their honesty levels, certain conditions give rise to a middle per capita income range, resulting in an optimal level of supervisory input that leads to a phenomenon known as “partial corruption.” During this phase, the wages paid by the government to its employees promote honesty, preventing them from engaging in corruption. However, they are unable to curb the corrupt activities of more dishonest officials. To some extent, this model also explains the challenges associated with eradicating corruption in several middle-income countries.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01930-5 |
| spellingShingle | Miao Zhang Houli Zhang Li Zhang Xu Peng Jiaxuan Zhu Duochenxi Liu Shibing You Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| title | Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development |
| title_full | Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development |
| title_fullStr | Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development |
| title_short | Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development |
| title_sort | corruption anti corruption and economic development |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01930-5 |
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