Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations
We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Open Publishing Association
2014-04-01
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| Series: | Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science |
| Online Access: | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.0835v1 |
| _version_ | 1828288205822099456 |
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| author | Lluís Godo Enrico Marchioni |
| author_facet | Lluís Godo Enrico Marchioni |
| author_sort | Lluís Godo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T10:00:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5a1c7877bad4427ca31d5bfed238546f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2075-2180 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T10:00:38Z |
| publishDate | 2014-04-01 |
| publisher | Open Publishing Association |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science |
| spelling | doaj.art-5a1c7877bad4427ca31d5bfed238546f2022-12-22T02:51:14ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802014-04-01146Proc. SR 201491510.4204/EPTCS.146.2:11Games for the Strategic Influence of ExpectationsLluís Godo0Enrico Marchioni1 IIIA - CSIC IRIT - UPS We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.0835v1 |
| spellingShingle | Lluís Godo Enrico Marchioni Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science |
| title | Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations |
| title_full | Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations |
| title_fullStr | Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations |
| title_full_unstemmed | Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations |
| title_short | Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations |
| title_sort | games for the strategic influence of expectations |
| url | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.0835v1 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lluisgodo gamesforthestrategicinfluenceofexpectations AT enricomarchioni gamesforthestrategicinfluenceofexpectations |