The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations
Sacrificing personal benefits for a common good is at odds with the fundamental principle of Darwinian evolution: if only the fittest survives, then there should be no place for cooperation. But cooperative behavior actually abounds, and constitutes one of the most persistent and fascinating puzzles...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2020-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ab9e89 |
| _version_ | 1797750414077067264 |
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| author | H Guo X Li K Hu X Dai D Jia S Boccaletti M Perc Z Wang |
| author_facet | H Guo X Li K Hu X Dai D Jia S Boccaletti M Perc Z Wang |
| author_sort | H Guo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Sacrificing personal benefits for a common good is at odds with the fundamental principle of Darwinian evolution: if only the fittest survives, then there should be no place for cooperation. But cooperative behavior actually abounds, and constitutes one of the most persistent and fascinating puzzles of nature. One solution to this puzzle is network reciprocity, where the collective dynamics of cooperators affords them protection against invading defectors. Commonly, however, such a competition does not unfold in isolation. Populations are often divided into sub-populations, with different evolutionary rules describing the interactions between them. Here we propose and study a paradigmatic model that captures the essence of this setup. Specifically, if two players belong to the same sub-population, they play the prisoner’s dilemma game. If not, they play either the harmony game, the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game, or the prisoner’s dilemma game. Due to such an asymmetry in the interactions across sub-populations, a fascinating evolutionary dynamics sets up that greatly expands the survivability of cooperators. For instance, when the harmony game applies, cyclic dominance spontaneously emerges, wherein cooperators in one sub-population become predators of defectors in the other sub-population. One also may observe self-organized segregation, wherein both sub-populations maintain a mixed state of cooperators and defectors. As a general rule, we show that the lower the dilemma strength between sub-populations, the more abundant the cooperative strategy in the entire population. Results are confirmed by means of Monte Carlo simulations with pair approximation method, which reveals a rich plethora of novel and generally valid paths to cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:32:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5a2d8aca2c8a4b47bf4d2607f698f178 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:32:21Z |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-5a2d8aca2c8a4b47bf4d2607f698f1782023-08-08T15:25:21ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302020-01-0122808301510.1088/1367-2630/ab9e89The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populationsH Guo0X Li1K Hu2X Dai3D Jia4S Boccaletti5M Perc6https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3087-541XZ Wang7School of Mechanical Engineering and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of ChinaSchool of Computer Science and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of ChinaDepartment of Statistics, School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics , Kunming, Yunnan 650221, People’s Republic of ChinaSchool of Mechanical Engineering and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of ChinaSchool of Mechanical Engineering and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of ChinaUnmanned Systems Research Institute, Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China; Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (National Research University) , 9 Institutskiy per., Dolgoprudny, Moscow Region, 141701, RussiaFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor , Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University , Taichung, Taiwan; Complexity Science Hub Vienna , Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, AustriaSchool of Mechanical Engineering and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University , Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of ChinaSacrificing personal benefits for a common good is at odds with the fundamental principle of Darwinian evolution: if only the fittest survives, then there should be no place for cooperation. But cooperative behavior actually abounds, and constitutes one of the most persistent and fascinating puzzles of nature. One solution to this puzzle is network reciprocity, where the collective dynamics of cooperators affords them protection against invading defectors. Commonly, however, such a competition does not unfold in isolation. Populations are often divided into sub-populations, with different evolutionary rules describing the interactions between them. Here we propose and study a paradigmatic model that captures the essence of this setup. Specifically, if two players belong to the same sub-population, they play the prisoner’s dilemma game. If not, they play either the harmony game, the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game, or the prisoner’s dilemma game. Due to such an asymmetry in the interactions across sub-populations, a fascinating evolutionary dynamics sets up that greatly expands the survivability of cooperators. For instance, when the harmony game applies, cyclic dominance spontaneously emerges, wherein cooperators in one sub-population become predators of defectors in the other sub-population. One also may observe self-organized segregation, wherein both sub-populations maintain a mixed state of cooperators and defectors. As a general rule, we show that the lower the dilemma strength between sub-populations, the more abundant the cooperative strategy in the entire population. Results are confirmed by means of Monte Carlo simulations with pair approximation method, which reveals a rich plethora of novel and generally valid paths to cooperation.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ab9e89social dilemmacyclic dominancemixed gamesasymmetric sub-populations |
| spellingShingle | H Guo X Li K Hu X Dai D Jia S Boccaletti M Perc Z Wang The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations New Journal of Physics social dilemma cyclic dominance mixed games asymmetric sub-populations |
| title | The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations |
| title_full | The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations |
| title_fullStr | The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations |
| title_full_unstemmed | The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations |
| title_short | The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub-populations |
| title_sort | dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric sub populations |
| topic | social dilemma cyclic dominance mixed games asymmetric sub-populations |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ab9e89 |
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