Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
This paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. This model is used to formalize a game in which electricity consumers find coalitions among themselves in order to t...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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IEEE
2021-01-01
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Series: | IEEE Access |
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Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9388689/ |
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author | Tiago Pinto Michael Wooldridge Zita Vale |
author_facet | Tiago Pinto Michael Wooldridge Zita Vale |
author_sort | Tiago Pinto |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. This model is used to formalize a game in which electricity consumers find coalitions among themselves in order to trade their consumption flexibility in the electricity market. Utility functions are defined to enable measuring the players preferences. Two case studies are presented, including a simple illustrative case, which assesses and explains the model in detail; and a large-scale scenario based on real data, comprising more than 20,000 consumers. Results show that the proposed model is able to reach solutions that are more suitable for the consumers when compared to the solutions achieved by traditional aggregation techniques in power and energy systems, such as clustering-based methodologies. The solutions found by the proposed model consider the perspectives from all players involved in the game and thus are able to reflect the rational behaviour of the involved players, rather than imposing an aggregation solution that is only beneficial from the perspective of the aggregator. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-17T05:15:21Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-5aa274b669bd43a18aada12878dbc876 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2169-3536 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-17T05:15:21Z |
publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
publisher | IEEE |
record_format | Article |
series | IEEE Access |
spelling | doaj.art-5aa274b669bd43a18aada12878dbc8762022-12-21T22:02:07ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362021-01-019515195153510.1109/ACCESS.2021.30694169388689Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable UtilityTiago Pinto0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8248-080XMichael Wooldridge1Zita Vale2https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4560-9544Research Group on Intelligent Engineering and Computing for Advanced Innovation and Development (GECAD), Polytechnic Institute of Porto (ISEP/IPP), Porto, PortugalDepartment of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, U.K.Research Group on Intelligent Engineering and Computing for Advanced Innovation and Development (GECAD), Polytechnic Institute of Porto (ISEP/IPP), Porto, PortugalThis paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. This model is used to formalize a game in which electricity consumers find coalitions among themselves in order to trade their consumption flexibility in the electricity market. Utility functions are defined to enable measuring the players preferences. Two case studies are presented, including a simple illustrative case, which assesses and explains the model in detail; and a large-scale scenario based on real data, comprising more than 20,000 consumers. Results show that the proposed model is able to reach solutions that are more suitable for the consumers when compared to the solutions achieved by traditional aggregation techniques in power and energy systems, such as clustering-based methodologies. The solutions found by the proposed model consider the perspectives from all players involved in the game and thus are able to reflect the rational behaviour of the involved players, rather than imposing an aggregation solution that is only beneficial from the perspective of the aggregator.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9388689/Coalitional game theoryconsumer flexibilitylarge-scale applicationpartition function gamesnon-transferable utility |
spellingShingle | Tiago Pinto Michael Wooldridge Zita Vale Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility IEEE Access Coalitional game theory consumer flexibility large-scale application partition function games non-transferable utility |
title | Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility |
title_full | Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility |
title_fullStr | Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility |
title_full_unstemmed | Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility |
title_short | Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility |
title_sort | consumer flexibility aggregation using partition function games with non transferable utility |
topic | Coalitional game theory consumer flexibility large-scale application partition function games non-transferable utility |
url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9388689/ |
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