Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility

This paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. This model is used to formalize a game in which electricity consumers find coalitions among themselves in order to t...

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Main Authors: Tiago Pinto, Michael Wooldridge, Zita Vale
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2021-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9388689/
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author Tiago Pinto
Michael Wooldridge
Zita Vale
author_facet Tiago Pinto
Michael Wooldridge
Zita Vale
author_sort Tiago Pinto
collection DOAJ
description This paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. This model is used to formalize a game in which electricity consumers find coalitions among themselves in order to trade their consumption flexibility in the electricity market. Utility functions are defined to enable measuring the players preferences. Two case studies are presented, including a simple illustrative case, which assesses and explains the model in detail; and a large-scale scenario based on real data, comprising more than 20,000 consumers. Results show that the proposed model is able to reach solutions that are more suitable for the consumers when compared to the solutions achieved by traditional aggregation techniques in power and energy systems, such as clustering-based methodologies. The solutions found by the proposed model consider the perspectives from all players involved in the game and thus are able to reflect the rational behaviour of the involved players, rather than imposing an aggregation solution that is only beneficial from the perspective of the aggregator.
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spelling doaj.art-5aa274b669bd43a18aada12878dbc8762022-12-21T22:02:07ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362021-01-019515195153510.1109/ACCESS.2021.30694169388689Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable UtilityTiago Pinto0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8248-080XMichael Wooldridge1Zita Vale2https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4560-9544Research Group on Intelligent Engineering and Computing for Advanced Innovation and Development (GECAD), Polytechnic Institute of Porto (ISEP/IPP), Porto, PortugalDepartment of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, U.K.Research Group on Intelligent Engineering and Computing for Advanced Innovation and Development (GECAD), Polytechnic Institute of Porto (ISEP/IPP), Porto, PortugalThis paper explores the aggregation of electricity consumers flexibility. A novel coalitional game theory model for partition function games with non-transferable utility is proposed. This model is used to formalize a game in which electricity consumers find coalitions among themselves in order to trade their consumption flexibility in the electricity market. Utility functions are defined to enable measuring the players preferences. Two case studies are presented, including a simple illustrative case, which assesses and explains the model in detail; and a large-scale scenario based on real data, comprising more than 20,000 consumers. Results show that the proposed model is able to reach solutions that are more suitable for the consumers when compared to the solutions achieved by traditional aggregation techniques in power and energy systems, such as clustering-based methodologies. The solutions found by the proposed model consider the perspectives from all players involved in the game and thus are able to reflect the rational behaviour of the involved players, rather than imposing an aggregation solution that is only beneficial from the perspective of the aggregator.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9388689/Coalitional game theoryconsumer flexibilitylarge-scale applicationpartition function gamesnon-transferable utility
spellingShingle Tiago Pinto
Michael Wooldridge
Zita Vale
Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
IEEE Access
Coalitional game theory
consumer flexibility
large-scale application
partition function games
non-transferable utility
title Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
title_full Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
title_fullStr Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
title_full_unstemmed Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
title_short Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
title_sort consumer flexibility aggregation using partition function games with non transferable utility
topic Coalitional game theory
consumer flexibility
large-scale application
partition function games
non-transferable utility
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9388689/
work_keys_str_mv AT tiagopinto consumerflexibilityaggregationusingpartitionfunctiongameswithnontransferableutility
AT michaelwooldridge consumerflexibilityaggregationusingpartitionfunctiongameswithnontransferableutility
AT zitavale consumerflexibilityaggregationusingpartitionfunctiongameswithnontransferableutility