Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory
Following Kuhn's main thesis according to which theory revision and acceptance is always paradigm relative, I propose to outline some possible consequences of such a view. First, asking the question in what sense Bayesian decision theory could serve as the appropriate (normative) theory of rati...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
1998-06-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18804/17386 |
| _version_ | 1819044363647320064 |
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| author | J. Nicolas Kaufmann |
| author_facet | J. Nicolas Kaufmann |
| author_sort | J. Nicolas Kaufmann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Following Kuhn's main thesis according to which theory revision and acceptance is always paradigm relative, I propose to outline some possible consequences of such a view. First, asking the question in what sense Bayesian decision theory could serve as the appropriate (normative) theory of rationality examined from the point of view of the epistemology of theory acceptance, I argue that Bayesianism leads to a narrow conception of theory acceptance. Second, regarding the different types of theory revision, i.e. expansion, contraction, replacement and residuals shifts, I extract from Kuhn's view a series of indications showing that theory replacement cannot be rationalized within the framework of Bayesian decision theory, not even within a more sophisticated version of that model. Third, and finally, I will point to the need for a more comprehensive model of rationality than the Bayesian expected utility maximization model, the need for a model which could better deal with the different aspects of theory replacement. I will show that Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science gives us several hints for a more adequate theory of rationality in science. I will also show that Kuhn is not in a position to fully articulate his main ideas and that he well be confronted with a serious problem concerning collective choice of a paradigm. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T10:11:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5ac18a20eabe46cb9d537ab8b1ff27eb |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T10:11:29Z |
| publishDate | 1998-06-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj.art-5ac18a20eabe46cb9d537ab8b1ff27eb2022-12-21T19:07:41ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17111998-06-01021320Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision TheoryJ. Nicolas KaufmannFollowing Kuhn's main thesis according to which theory revision and acceptance is always paradigm relative, I propose to outline some possible consequences of such a view. First, asking the question in what sense Bayesian decision theory could serve as the appropriate (normative) theory of rationality examined from the point of view of the epistemology of theory acceptance, I argue that Bayesianism leads to a narrow conception of theory acceptance. Second, regarding the different types of theory revision, i.e. expansion, contraction, replacement and residuals shifts, I extract from Kuhn's view a series of indications showing that theory replacement cannot be rationalized within the framework of Bayesian decision theory, not even within a more sophisticated version of that model. Third, and finally, I will point to the need for a more comprehensive model of rationality than the Bayesian expected utility maximization model, the need for a model which could better deal with the different aspects of theory replacement. I will show that Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science gives us several hints for a more adequate theory of rationality in science. I will also show that Kuhn is not in a position to fully articulate his main ideas and that he well be confronted with a serious problem concerning collective choice of a paradigm.http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18804/17386BayesianismKuhnTheory Acceptance |
| spellingShingle | J. Nicolas Kaufmann Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Bayesianism Kuhn Theory Acceptance |
| title | Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory |
| title_full | Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory |
| title_fullStr | Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory |
| title_short | Rationality, Theory Acceptance and Decision Theory |
| title_sort | rationality theory acceptance and decision theory |
| topic | Bayesianism Kuhn Theory Acceptance |
| url | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18804/17386 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jnicolaskaufmann rationalitytheoryacceptanceanddecisiontheory |