Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players minimize the present val...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2017-07-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/30 |
| _version_ | 1828873891485843456 |
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| author | Katharina Schüller Kateřina Staňková Frank Thuijsman |
| author_facet | Katharina Schüller Kateřina Staňková Frank Thuijsman |
| author_sort | Katharina Schüller |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players minimize the present value of their own costs defined as a linear combination of pollution costs and costs of environmentally friendly policies, where the state vector of the system consists of the pollution stock per country. A player’s time-varying decision is her investment into clean policies, while her expected costs include also pollution caused by her neighbors. We analyze three variants of this game: (1) a Nash game in which each player chooses her investment into clean policies such that her expected costs are minimal, (2) a game in which the players imitate the investments into clean policies of their neighbors without taking the neighbor’s success concerning their costs into account and (3) a game in which each player imitates her neighbors’ investments into clean policies if this behavior seems to bring a profit. In each of these scenarios, we show under which conditions the countries have incentives to act environmentally friendly. We argue that the different results of these games can be used to understand and design effective environmental policies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T07:24:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5ae120eb794349d4a483dac3bd074552 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T07:24:34Z |
| publishDate | 2017-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-5ae120eb794349d4a483dac3bd0745522022-12-21T23:55:19ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362017-07-01833010.3390/g8030030g8030030Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International EffectsKatharina Schüller0Kateřina Staňková1Frank Thuijsman2Department of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The NetherlandsDepartment of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The NetherlandsDepartment of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The NetherlandsIn this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players minimize the present value of their own costs defined as a linear combination of pollution costs and costs of environmentally friendly policies, where the state vector of the system consists of the pollution stock per country. A player’s time-varying decision is her investment into clean policies, while her expected costs include also pollution caused by her neighbors. We analyze three variants of this game: (1) a Nash game in which each player chooses her investment into clean policies such that her expected costs are minimal, (2) a game in which the players imitate the investments into clean policies of their neighbors without taking the neighbor’s success concerning their costs into account and (3) a game in which each player imitates her neighbors’ investments into clean policies if this behavior seems to bring a profit. In each of these scenarios, we show under which conditions the countries have incentives to act environmentally friendly. We argue that the different results of these games can be used to understand and design effective environmental policies.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/30pollutiongame theoryoptimal controlimitationcooperationNash gameStackelberg game |
| spellingShingle | Katharina Schüller Kateřina Staňková Frank Thuijsman Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects Games pollution game theory optimal control imitation cooperation Nash game Stackelberg game |
| title | Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects |
| title_full | Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects |
| title_fullStr | Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects |
| title_short | Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects |
| title_sort | game theory of pollution national policies and their international effects |
| topic | pollution game theory optimal control imitation cooperation Nash game Stackelberg game |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/30 |
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