5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective
The V2V services have been specified by the 3GPP standards body to support road safety and non-safety applications in the 5G cellular networks. It is expected to use the direct link (known as the PC5 interface), as well as the new radio interface in 5G, to provide a connectivity platform among vehic...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2021-09-01
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| Series: | Array |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590005621000321 |
| _version_ | 1818587800971247616 |
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| author | Mujahid Muhammad Ghazanfar Ali Safdar |
| author_facet | Mujahid Muhammad Ghazanfar Ali Safdar |
| author_sort | Mujahid Muhammad |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The V2V services have been specified by the 3GPP standards body to support road safety and non-safety applications in the 5G cellular networks. It is expected to use the direct link (known as the PC5 interface), as well as the new radio interface in 5G, to provide a connectivity platform among vehicles. Particularly, vehicles will use the PC5 interface to broadcast safety messages to inform each other about potential hazards on the road. In order to function safely, robust security mechanisms are needed to ensure the authenticity of received messages and trustworthiness of message senders. These mechanisms must neither add significantly to message latency nor affect the performance of safety applications. The existing 5G-V2V standard allow protection of V2V messages to be handled by higher layer security solutions defined by other standards in the ITS domain. However having a security solution at the 5G access layer is conceivably preferable in order to ensure system compatibility and reduce deployment cost. Accordingly, the main aim of this paper is to review options for 3GPP access layer security in future 5G-V2V releases. Initially, a summary of 5G-V2V communications and corresponding service requirements is presented. An overview of the application level security standards is also given, followed by a review of the impending options to secure V2V broadcast messages at the 5G access layer. Finally, paper presents the relevant open issues and challenges on providing 3GPP access layer security solution for direct V2V communication. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-16T09:14:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5ae68fa57f224456b1970846069927a4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2590-0056 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-16T09:14:37Z |
| publishDate | 2021-09-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Array |
| spelling | doaj.art-5ae68fa57f224456b1970846069927a42022-12-21T22:36:56ZengElsevierArray2590-00562021-09-01111000845G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspectiveMujahid Muhammad0Ghazanfar Ali Safdar1Birmingham City University, Birmingham, B4 7XG, United KingdomUniversity of Bedfordshire, Luton, LU1 3JU, United Kingdom; Corresponding author.The V2V services have been specified by the 3GPP standards body to support road safety and non-safety applications in the 5G cellular networks. It is expected to use the direct link (known as the PC5 interface), as well as the new radio interface in 5G, to provide a connectivity platform among vehicles. Particularly, vehicles will use the PC5 interface to broadcast safety messages to inform each other about potential hazards on the road. In order to function safely, robust security mechanisms are needed to ensure the authenticity of received messages and trustworthiness of message senders. These mechanisms must neither add significantly to message latency nor affect the performance of safety applications. The existing 5G-V2V standard allow protection of V2V messages to be handled by higher layer security solutions defined by other standards in the ITS domain. However having a security solution at the 5G access layer is conceivably preferable in order to ensure system compatibility and reduce deployment cost. Accordingly, the main aim of this paper is to review options for 3GPP access layer security in future 5G-V2V releases. Initially, a summary of 5G-V2V communications and corresponding service requirements is presented. An overview of the application level security standards is also given, followed by a review of the impending options to secure V2V broadcast messages at the 5G access layer. Finally, paper presents the relevant open issues and challenges on providing 3GPP access layer security solution for direct V2V communication.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590005621000321AuthenticationMessage integrityV2X services5G securityV2V communications |
| spellingShingle | Mujahid Muhammad Ghazanfar Ali Safdar 5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective Array Authentication Message integrity V2X services 5G security V2V communications |
| title | 5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective |
| title_full | 5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective |
| title_fullStr | 5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | 5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective |
| title_short | 5G-based V2V broadcast communications: A security perspective |
| title_sort | 5g based v2v broadcast communications a security perspective |
| topic | Authentication Message integrity V2X services 5G security V2V communications |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590005621000321 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mujahidmuhammad 5gbasedv2vbroadcastcommunicationsasecurityperspective AT ghazanfaralisafdar 5gbasedv2vbroadcastcommunicationsasecurityperspective |