In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment
The dual process model of moral judgment (DPM; Greene et al., 2004) argues that such judgments are influenced by both emotion-laden intuition and controlled reasoning. These influences are associated with distinct neural circuitries and different response tendencies. After reanalyzing data from an e...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2011-04-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/11/10310/jdm10310.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797761172159594496 |
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| author | Adam B. Moore N. Y. Louis Lee Brian A. M. Clark Andrew R. A. Conway |
| author_facet | Adam B. Moore N. Y. Louis Lee Brian A. M. Clark Andrew R. A. Conway |
| author_sort | Adam B. Moore |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The dual process model of moral judgment (DPM; Greene et al., 2004) argues that such judgments are influenced by both emotion-laden intuition and controlled reasoning. These influences are associated with distinct neural circuitries and different response tendencies. After reanalyzing data from an earlier study, McGuire et al. (2009) questioned the level of support for the dual process model and asserted that the distinction between emotion evoking moral dilemmas (personal dilemmas) and those that do not trigger such intuitions (impersonal dilemmas) is spurious. Using similar reanalysis methods on data reported by Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008), we show that the personal/impersonal distinction is reliable. Furthermore, new data show that this distinction is fundamental to moral judgment across widely different cultures (U.S. and China) and supports claims made by the DPM. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T19:09:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5b6921fe13ca4d8aaeb02a420df13bda |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T19:09:06Z |
| publishDate | 2011-04-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-5b6921fe13ca4d8aaeb02a420df13bda2023-08-02T06:00:55ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752011-04-0163186195In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgmentAdam B. MooreN. Y. Louis LeeBrian A. M. ClarkAndrew R. A. ConwayThe dual process model of moral judgment (DPM; Greene et al., 2004) argues that such judgments are influenced by both emotion-laden intuition and controlled reasoning. These influences are associated with distinct neural circuitries and different response tendencies. After reanalyzing data from an earlier study, McGuire et al. (2009) questioned the level of support for the dual process model and asserted that the distinction between emotion evoking moral dilemmas (personal dilemmas) and those that do not trigger such intuitions (impersonal dilemmas) is spurious. Using similar reanalysis methods on data reported by Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008), we show that the personal/impersonal distinction is reliable. Furthermore, new data show that this distinction is fundamental to moral judgment across widely different cultures (U.S. and China) and supports claims made by the DPM.http://journal.sjdm.org/11/10310/jdm10310.pdfmoral judgmentdual process modelEx-Gaussian methodculture.NAKeywords |
| spellingShingle | Adam B. Moore N. Y. Louis Lee Brian A. M. Clark Andrew R. A. Conway In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment Judgment and Decision Making moral judgment dual process model Ex-Gaussian method culture.NAKeywords |
| title | In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment |
| title_full | In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment |
| title_fullStr | In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment |
| title_full_unstemmed | In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment |
| title_short | In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment |
| title_sort | in defense of the personal impersonal distinction in moral psychology research cross cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment |
| topic | moral judgment dual process model Ex-Gaussian method culture.NAKeywords |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/11/10310/jdm10310.pdf |
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