Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations
Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience - nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, event...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381701113W.pdf |
| _version_ | 1818270264100651008 |
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| author | Westphal Kenneth R. |
| author_facet | Westphal Kenneth R. |
| author_sort | Westphal Kenneth R. |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both
prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting
through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience - nor could we
think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people -
unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal
world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn,
not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating
various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon
the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses
concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our
finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects
of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical
knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways,
using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I.
Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend
the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate
such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have
found them persuasive or illuminating. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T21:07:31Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-5bfc859dffda46cdab07d1588db71038 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T21:07:31Z |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Filozofija i Društvo |
| spelling | doaj.art-5bfc859dffda46cdab07d1588db710382022-12-22T00:11:59ZdeuInstitute for Philosophy and Social Theory, BelgradeFilozofija i Društvo0353-57382334-85772017-01-0128111313510.2298/FID1701113W0353-57381701113WScepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderationsWestphal Kenneth R.0Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Department of Philosophy, İstanbul, TurkeyKant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience - nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people - unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381701113W.pdfscepticismtranscendental proofmental content externalismKantHegelC.I. LewisHeideggerWittgenstein |
| spellingShingle | Westphal Kenneth R. Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations Filozofija i Društvo scepticism transcendental proof mental content externalism Kant Hegel C.I. Lewis Heidegger Wittgenstein |
| title | Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations |
| title_full | Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations |
| title_fullStr | Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations |
| title_full_unstemmed | Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations |
| title_short | Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations |
| title_sort | scepticism transcendental arguments some methodological reconsiderations |
| topic | scepticism transcendental proof mental content externalism Kant Hegel C.I. Lewis Heidegger Wittgenstein |
| url | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381701113W.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT westphalkennethr scepticismtranscendentalargumentssomemethodologicalreconsiderations |