The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do

In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that pro...

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Main Author: Schwenkenbecher Anne
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Vienna 2020-08-01
Series:Journal of Social Ontology
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0048
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author Schwenkenbecher Anne
author_facet Schwenkenbecher Anne
author_sort Schwenkenbecher Anne
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description In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.
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spelling doaj.art-5d37e8deb60e4f05b76841e41fd25ebc2023-09-02T19:39:06ZengUniversity of ViennaJournal of Social Ontology2196-96552196-96632020-08-01619110010.1515/jso-2020-0048jso-2020-0048The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to doSchwenkenbecher Anne0Murdoch University, Murdoch, 6150, Western Australia, AustraliaIn Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0048
spellingShingle Schwenkenbecher Anne
The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
Journal of Social Ontology
title The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
title_full The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
title_fullStr The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
title_full_unstemmed The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
title_short The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
title_sort epistemology of group duties what we know and what we ought to do
url https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0048
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