The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting

This study examines the effect of foreign directors in the board of directors on the monitoring function by analyzing the association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting. The authors address this question by examining the effect of the foreign directors in the board on fi...

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Main Authors: JungHwa Suh, Ho-Young Lee, Hansol Lee
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: LLC "CPC "Business Perspectives" 2018-11-01
Series:Investment Management & Financial Innovations
Subjects:
Online Access:https://businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/11121/imfi_2018_04_Suh.pdf
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author JungHwa Suh
Ho-Young Lee
Hansol Lee
author_facet JungHwa Suh
Ho-Young Lee
Hansol Lee
author_sort JungHwa Suh
collection DOAJ
description This study examines the effect of foreign directors in the board of directors on the monitoring function by analyzing the association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting. The authors address this question by examining the effect of the foreign directors in the board on firms’ discretionary accruals and book-tax difference. The researchers analyze by using Korean firm data for the years 2001–2014 as Korea is one of the few countries that nepotism is strong within the board, providing the ideal setting to analyze the effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function of the board. The authors find that foreign directors have a positive effect on the monitoring function of the board, as discretionary accruals and book-tax differences of firms with foreign directors are lower than those without foreign directors. Further, the researchers find that the positive effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function is more pronounced if foreign directors are independent directors or expertise in accounting or finance. Overall, the findings support the view that foreign directors in the board increase the board diversity, which increases the independence of the board and so the monitoring function.
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spelling doaj.art-5d546a8b239d4aed81ec5b4d5be66e4b2022-12-22T02:46:33ZengLLC "CPC "Business Perspectives"Investment Management & Financial Innovations1810-49671812-93582018-11-011549811210.21511/imfi.15(4).2018.0811121The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reportingJungHwa Suh0Ho-Young Lee1Hansol Lee2Ph.D. Candidate, Yonsei University, SeoulProfessor, Yonsei University, SeoulPh.D. Candidate, Yonsei University, SeoulThis study examines the effect of foreign directors in the board of directors on the monitoring function by analyzing the association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting. The authors address this question by examining the effect of the foreign directors in the board on firms’ discretionary accruals and book-tax difference. The researchers analyze by using Korean firm data for the years 2001–2014 as Korea is one of the few countries that nepotism is strong within the board, providing the ideal setting to analyze the effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function of the board. The authors find that foreign directors have a positive effect on the monitoring function of the board, as discretionary accruals and book-tax differences of firms with foreign directors are lower than those without foreign directors. Further, the researchers find that the positive effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function is more pronounced if foreign directors are independent directors or expertise in accounting or finance. Overall, the findings support the view that foreign directors in the board increase the board diversity, which increases the independence of the board and so the monitoring function.https://businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/11121/imfi_2018_04_Suh.pdfboard diversityboard independencebook-tax differencediscretionary accrualsforeign directormonitoring function
spellingShingle JungHwa Suh
Ho-Young Lee
Hansol Lee
The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
Investment Management & Financial Innovations
board diversity
board independence
book-tax difference
discretionary accruals
foreign director
monitoring function
title The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
title_full The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
title_fullStr The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
title_full_unstemmed The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
title_short The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
title_sort association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting
topic board diversity
board independence
book-tax difference
discretionary accruals
foreign director
monitoring function
url https://businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/11121/imfi_2018_04_Suh.pdf
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