Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity
One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2018-07-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269/full |
| _version_ | 1818152388816535552 |
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| author | Michal Polák Tomáš Marvan |
| author_facet | Michal Polák Tomáš Marvan |
| author_sort | Michal Polák |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T13:53:56Z |
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| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T13:53:56Z |
| publishDate | 2018-07-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-5e22ec94e10f404ca34f320d0452005b2022-12-22T01:04:09ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782018-07-01910.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269381399Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of IdentityMichal Polák0Tomáš Marvan1Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, CzechiaThe Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, Prague, CzechiaOne of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269/fullneural correlates of consciousness (NCCs)type identity theoryphenomenal statestype-tokennon-causal account of NCC |
| spellingShingle | Michal Polák Tomáš Marvan Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity Frontiers in Psychology neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) type identity theory phenomenal states type-token non-causal account of NCC |
| title | Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity |
| title_full | Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity |
| title_fullStr | Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity |
| title_short | Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity |
| title_sort | neural correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity |
| topic | neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) type identity theory phenomenal states type-token non-causal account of NCC |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269/full |
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