Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904

In this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker–Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political involvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when reward...

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Main Author: Valentín Figueroa
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2016-01-01
Series:Journal of Politics in Latin America
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/940
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author Valentín Figueroa
author_facet Valentín Figueroa
author_sort Valentín Figueroa
collection DOAJ
description In this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker–Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political involvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when rewards are expected to be higher, and information more abundant. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I employ differences-in-means and differences-in-differences techniques to esti-mate the effect of electoral proximity on the political involvement of justices of the peace in the city of Buenos Aires in 1904. I find a large, positive, and highly local effect of electoral proximity on their political involvement, with no appreciable impact in the months before or after elections.
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spelling doaj.art-5e5d7b51b7ec43689636a84839a56f052022-12-21T23:58:26ZengSAGE PublishingJournal of Politics in Latin America1868-48902016-01-01816994Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904Valentín Figueroa0Universidad Torcuato Di Tella / IIGGIn this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker–Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political involvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when rewards are expected to be higher, and information more abundant. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I employ differences-in-means and differences-in-differences techniques to esti-mate the effect of electoral proximity on the political involvement of justices of the peace in the city of Buenos Aires in 1904. I find a large, positive, and highly local effect of electoral proximity on their political involvement, with no appreciable impact in the months before or after elections.http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/940Political ScienceLatin American PoliticsArgentinabureaucracyelectoral fraud300320322324Argentina1904
spellingShingle Valentín Figueroa
Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
Journal of Politics in Latin America
Political Science
Latin American Politics
Argentina
bureaucracy
electoral fraud
300
320
322
324
Argentina
1904
title Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
title_full Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
title_fullStr Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
title_full_unstemmed Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
title_short Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
title_sort electoral proximity and the political involvement of bureaucrats a natural experiment in argentina 1904
topic Political Science
Latin American Politics
Argentina
bureaucracy
electoral fraud
300
320
322
324
Argentina
1904
url http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/940
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