Mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium. An experimental comparison using RPS games
In this paper I test the hypothesis according to which the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) solution concept significantly outperforms the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) in experimental situations. The testing ground for the hypothesis is an experiment with variations of the RPS game appli...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
General Association of Economists from Romania
2014-10-01
|
| Series: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/1030.pdf
|
| Summary: | In this paper I test the hypothesis according to which the Quantal
Response Equilibrium (QRE) solution concept significantly outperforms the Mixed
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) in experimental situations. The testing ground
for the hypothesis is an experiment with variations of the RPS game applied in
June 2013 to students from various universities in Bucharest. The results of the
experiment show that the QRE solution does not perform substantially better than
the Nash Equilibrium for two of the three games studied and that it does represent
a slight improvement in only one of the games. This result lies in stark contrast to
the bulk of the literature developed thusfar on the QRE solution. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1841-8678 1844-0029 |