A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game

This paper investigated a multistage sustainable production–inventory model for deteriorating items (i.e., raw materials and finished goods) with price-dependent demand and collaborative carbon reduction technology investment under carbon tax regulation. The model was developed by first defining the...

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Main Authors: Chi-Jie Lu, Tian-Shyug Lee, Ming Gu, Chih-Te Yang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-07-01
Series:Applied Sciences
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/14/4878
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author Chi-Jie Lu
Tian-Shyug Lee
Ming Gu
Chih-Te Yang
author_facet Chi-Jie Lu
Tian-Shyug Lee
Ming Gu
Chih-Te Yang
author_sort Chi-Jie Lu
collection DOAJ
description This paper investigated a multistage sustainable production–inventory model for deteriorating items (i.e., raw materials and finished goods) with price-dependent demand and collaborative carbon reduction technology investment under carbon tax regulation. The model was developed by first defining the total profit of the supply chain members under carbon tax regulation and, second, considering a manufacturer (leader)–retailer (follower) Stackelberg game. The optimal equilibrium solutions that maximize the manufacturer’s and retailer’s total profits were determined through the method analysis. An algorithm complemented the model to determine the optimal equilibrium solutions, which were then treated with sensitivity analyses for the major parameters. Based on the numerical analysis, (a) carbon tax policies help reduce carbon emissions for both the manufacturer and retailer; (b) most carbon emissions from supply chain operations negatively impact the total profits of both members; (c) the retailer may increase the optimal equilibrium selling price to respond to an increase in carbon emissions from supply chain operations or carbon tax; and (d) autonomous consumption positively affects both members’ optimal equilibrium policies and total profits, whereas induced consumption does the opposite. These findings are very managerial and instructive for companies seeking profits and fulfilling environmental responsibility and governments.
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spelling doaj.art-5f5727f639fd4790b0bcc0152471633f2023-11-20T06:57:30ZengMDPI AGApplied Sciences2076-34172020-07-011014487810.3390/app10144878A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg GameChi-Jie Lu0Tian-Shyug Lee1Ming Gu2Chih-Te Yang3Graduate Institute of Business Administration, Fu Jen Catholic University, New Taipei City 242, TaiwanGraduate Institute of Business Administration, Fu Jen Catholic University, New Taipei City 242, TaiwanGraduate Institute of Business Administration, Fu Jen Catholic University, New Taipei City 242, TaiwanDepartment of International Business, Chien Hsin University of Science and Technology, Taoyuan City 320, TaiwanThis paper investigated a multistage sustainable production–inventory model for deteriorating items (i.e., raw materials and finished goods) with price-dependent demand and collaborative carbon reduction technology investment under carbon tax regulation. The model was developed by first defining the total profit of the supply chain members under carbon tax regulation and, second, considering a manufacturer (leader)–retailer (follower) Stackelberg game. The optimal equilibrium solutions that maximize the manufacturer’s and retailer’s total profits were determined through the method analysis. An algorithm complemented the model to determine the optimal equilibrium solutions, which were then treated with sensitivity analyses for the major parameters. Based on the numerical analysis, (a) carbon tax policies help reduce carbon emissions for both the manufacturer and retailer; (b) most carbon emissions from supply chain operations negatively impact the total profits of both members; (c) the retailer may increase the optimal equilibrium selling price to respond to an increase in carbon emissions from supply chain operations or carbon tax; and (d) autonomous consumption positively affects both members’ optimal equilibrium policies and total profits, whereas induced consumption does the opposite. These findings are very managerial and instructive for companies seeking profits and fulfilling environmental responsibility and governments.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/14/4878multistage supply chainproduction–inventory modelcarbon emissionprice-dependent demandStackelberg game
spellingShingle Chi-Jie Lu
Tian-Shyug Lee
Ming Gu
Chih-Te Yang
A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game
Applied Sciences
multistage supply chain
production–inventory model
carbon emission
price-dependent demand
Stackelberg game
title A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game
title_full A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game
title_fullStr A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game
title_full_unstemmed A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game
title_short A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game
title_sort multistage sustainable production inventory model with carbon emission reduction and price dependent demand under stackelberg game
topic multistage supply chain
production–inventory model
carbon emission
price-dependent demand
Stackelberg game
url https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/14/4878
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