Representation effects in the centipede game.

We explore the effects on strategic behavior of alternative representations of a centipede game that differ in terms of complexity. In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate the way in which payoffs are presented to subjects in two different ways. In both cases, information is made less accessible r...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Paolo Crosetto, Marco Mantovani
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2018-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC6171843?pdf=render
_version_ 1818986673976901632
author Paolo Crosetto
Marco Mantovani
author_facet Paolo Crosetto
Marco Mantovani
author_sort Paolo Crosetto
collection DOAJ
description We explore the effects on strategic behavior of alternative representations of a centipede game that differ in terms of complexity. In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate the way in which payoffs are presented to subjects in two different ways. In both cases, information is made less accessible relative to the standard representation of the game. Results show that these manipulations shift the distribution of take nodes further away from the equilibrium prediction. The evidence is consistent with the view that failures of game-form recognition and the resulting limits to strategic reasoning are crucial for explaining non-equilibrium behavior in the centipede game.
first_indexed 2024-12-20T18:54:32Z
format Article
id doaj.art-5fab1056a68c45c495ac8512d9c2058d
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 1932-6203
language English
last_indexed 2024-12-20T18:54:32Z
publishDate 2018-01-01
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
record_format Article
series PLoS ONE
spelling doaj.art-5fab1056a68c45c495ac8512d9c2058d2022-12-21T19:29:33ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032018-01-011310e020442210.1371/journal.pone.0204422Representation effects in the centipede game.Paolo CrosettoMarco MantovaniWe explore the effects on strategic behavior of alternative representations of a centipede game that differ in terms of complexity. In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate the way in which payoffs are presented to subjects in two different ways. In both cases, information is made less accessible relative to the standard representation of the game. Results show that these manipulations shift the distribution of take nodes further away from the equilibrium prediction. The evidence is consistent with the view that failures of game-form recognition and the resulting limits to strategic reasoning are crucial for explaining non-equilibrium behavior in the centipede game.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC6171843?pdf=render
spellingShingle Paolo Crosetto
Marco Mantovani
Representation effects in the centipede game.
PLoS ONE
title Representation effects in the centipede game.
title_full Representation effects in the centipede game.
title_fullStr Representation effects in the centipede game.
title_full_unstemmed Representation effects in the centipede game.
title_short Representation effects in the centipede game.
title_sort representation effects in the centipede game
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC6171843?pdf=render
work_keys_str_mv AT paolocrosetto representationeffectsinthecentipedegame
AT marcomantovani representationeffectsinthecentipedegame