Aboriginal ‘resistance war’ tactics – ‘The Black War’ of southern Queensland

Frontier violence is now an accepted chapter of Australian history.  Indigenous resistance is central to this story, yet little examined as a military phenomenon (Connor 2004).  Indigenous military tactics and objectives are more often assumed than analysed. Building on Laurie’s and Cilento’s conte...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Raymond Constant Kerkhove
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: UTS ePRESS 2015-02-01
Series:Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal
Subjects:
Online Access:https://learning-analytics.info/journals/index.php/mcs/article/view/4218
Description
Summary:Frontier violence is now an accepted chapter of Australian history.  Indigenous resistance is central to this story, yet little examined as a military phenomenon (Connor 2004).  Indigenous military tactics and objectives are more often assumed than analysed. Building on Laurie’s and Cilento’s contentions (1959) that an alliance of Aboriginal groups staged a ‘Black War’ across southern Queensland between the 1840s and 1860s, the author seeks evidence for a historically definable conflict during this period, complete with a declaration, coordination, leadership, planning and a broader objective: usurping the pastoral industry.   As the Australian situation continues to present elements which have proved difficult to reconcile with existing paradigms for military history, this study applies definitions from guerilla and terrorist conflict (e.g. Eckley 2001, Kilcullen 2009) to explain key features of the southern Queensland “Black War.” The author concludes that Indigenous resistance, to judge from southern Queensland, followed its own distinctive pattern.  It achieved coordinated response through inter-tribal gatherings and sophisticated signaling.  It relied on economic sabotage, targeted payback killings and harassment.  It was guided by reticent “loner-leaders.” Contrary to the claims of military historians such as Dennis (1995), the author finds evidence for tactical innovation.  He notes a move away from pitched battles to ambush affrays; the development of full-time ‘guerilla bands’; and use of new materials.
ISSN:1837-5391