The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology

This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to...

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Main Author: Cyril Hédoin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Vienna 2022-03-01
Series:Journal of Social Ontology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6732
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author Cyril Hédoin
author_facet Cyril Hédoin
author_sort Cyril Hédoin
collection DOAJ
description This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to study the role and the functioning of institutions in human societies. I intend to show how recent developments in the economic analysis of rules and institutions can help solve issues that are generally considered constitutive of any ontological inquiry. I argue that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can contribute to advancing the debate on an issue of particular importance, regarding the specific form of dependence characterizing the relation between institutions and individuals’ attitudes about them. I tackle this issue by taking Francesco Guala's claims about the nature of institutions made in his book “Understanding Institutions” as a point of departure. In particular, I reject Guala’s functionalism about institutions. On the basis of the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account, I claim that it is futile to search for constitutive features of general institutions (money, property rights, family…) and that the best we can have is a knowledge of what are the rules within a specific institution, which the agents consider to be essential in their institutional practice.
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spelling doaj.art-603cc15787af4db5bb2bcf6601f9fd002023-05-28T07:32:05ZengUniversity of ViennaJournal of Social Ontology2196-96632022-03-0171The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social OntologyCyril Hédoin0University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to study the role and the functioning of institutions in human societies. I intend to show how recent developments in the economic analysis of rules and institutions can help solve issues that are generally considered constitutive of any ontological inquiry. I argue that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can contribute to advancing the debate on an issue of particular importance, regarding the specific form of dependence characterizing the relation between institutions and individuals’ attitudes about them. I tackle this issue by taking Francesco Guala's claims about the nature of institutions made in his book “Understanding Institutions” as a point of departure. In particular, I reject Guala’s functionalism about institutions. On the basis of the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account, I claim that it is futile to search for constitutive features of general institutions (money, property rights, family…) and that the best we can have is a knowledge of what are the rules within a specific institution, which the agents consider to be essential in their institutional practice. https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6732beliefs-rules-equilibrium accountinstitutionsrealismsocial ontologysocial kinds
spellingShingle Cyril Hédoin
The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
Journal of Social Ontology
beliefs-rules-equilibrium account
institutions
realism
social ontology
social kinds
title The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
title_full The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
title_fullStr The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
title_full_unstemmed The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
title_short The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
title_sort beliefs rules equilibrium account of institutions a contribution to a naturalistic social ontology
topic beliefs-rules-equilibrium account
institutions
realism
social ontology
social kinds
url https://journalofsocialontology.org/index.php/jso/article/view/6732
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