Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios
Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying f...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2022-09-01
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| Series: | Entropy |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/9/1289 |
| _version_ | 1797488645591007232 |
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| author | Jun Qian Xiao Sun Tongda Zhang Yueting Chai |
| author_facet | Jun Qian Xiao Sun Tongda Zhang Yueting Chai |
| author_sort | Jun Qian |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals’ gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T00:05:16Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6065a7a8a56741d0a2281ebf9c010364 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1099-4300 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T00:05:16Z |
| publishDate | 2022-09-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Entropy |
| spelling | doaj.art-6065a7a8a56741d0a2281ebf9c0103642023-11-23T16:09:11ZengMDPI AGEntropy1099-43002022-09-01249128910.3390/e24091289Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant ScenariosJun Qian0Xiao Sun1Tongda Zhang2Yueting Chai3National Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, ChinaNational Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, ChinaDepartment of Mechanical and Energy Engineering, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen 518055, ChinaNational Engineering Laboratory for E-Commerce Technologies, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, ChinaGame theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals’ gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models.https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/9/1289central punishmentpeer punishmentrisk-resistant modelcollaborationevolutionary game theory |
| spellingShingle | Jun Qian Xiao Sun Tongda Zhang Yueting Chai Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios Entropy central punishment peer punishment risk-resistant model collaboration evolutionary game theory |
| title | Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios |
| title_full | Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios |
| title_fullStr | Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios |
| title_full_unstemmed | Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios |
| title_short | Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios |
| title_sort | authority or autonomy exploring interactions between central and peer punishments in risk resistant scenarios |
| topic | central punishment peer punishment risk-resistant model collaboration evolutionary game theory |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/9/1289 |
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