Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
The paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | ces |
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Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy
2021-12-01
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Series: | Filosofický časopis |
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author | Fábiková, Andrea |
author_facet | Fábiková, Andrea |
author_sort | Fábiková, Andrea |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by Plantinga to justify this thesis suffer from a common defect – they disregard the condition of evolution or fail to take it into account properly. In addition, I argue that pointing out the difficulties that naturalistic approaches have in explaining mental causation does not lead to Plantinga’s conclusion that in a naturalistic world there would be no mental causation whatsoever. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-20T06:40:40Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-609ff06b00b64283a7f6e0a69f3b29f7 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0015-1831 2570-9232 |
language | ces |
last_indexed | 2024-12-20T06:40:40Z |
publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
publisher | Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy |
record_format | Article |
series | Filosofický časopis |
spelling | doaj.art-609ff06b00b64283a7f6e0a69f3b29f72022-12-21T19:49:51ZcesCzech Academy of Sciences, Institute of PhilosophyFilosofický časopis0015-18312570-92322021-12-0169Special Issue 3627410.46854/fc.2021.3s62Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilismFábiková, AndreaThe paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by Plantinga to justify this thesis suffer from a common defect – they disregard the condition of evolution or fail to take it into account properly. In addition, I argue that pointing out the difficulties that naturalistic approaches have in explaining mental causation does not lead to Plantinga’s conclusion that in a naturalistic world there would be no mental causation whatsoever.alvin plantingadarwin’s doubtevolutionary reliabilismthe evolutionary argument against naturalism |
spellingShingle | Fábiková, Andrea Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism Filosofický časopis alvin plantinga darwin’s doubt evolutionary reliabilism the evolutionary argument against naturalism |
title | Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism |
title_full | Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism |
title_fullStr | Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism |
title_full_unstemmed | Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism |
title_short | Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism |
title_sort | adaptivity and truth a critique of plantinga s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism |
topic | alvin plantinga darwin’s doubt evolutionary reliabilism the evolutionary argument against naturalism |
work_keys_str_mv | AT fabikovaandrea adaptivityandtruthacritiqueofplantingasreasoningagainstevolutionaryreliabilism |