Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism

The paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by...

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Main Author: Fábiková, Andrea
Format: Article
Language:ces
Published: Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy 2021-12-01
Series:Filosofický časopis
Subjects:
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author Fábiková, Andrea
author_facet Fábiková, Andrea
author_sort Fábiková, Andrea
collection DOAJ
description The paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by Plantinga to justify this thesis suffer from a common defect – they disregard the condition of evolution or fail to take it into account properly. In addition, I argue that pointing out the difficulties that naturalistic approaches have in explaining mental causation does not lead to Plantinga’s conclusion that in a naturalistic world there would be no mental causation whatsoever.
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spelling doaj.art-609ff06b00b64283a7f6e0a69f3b29f72022-12-21T19:49:51ZcesCzech Academy of Sciences, Institute of PhilosophyFilosofický časopis0015-18312570-92322021-12-0169Special Issue 3627410.46854/fc.2021.3s62Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilismFábiková, AndreaThe paper analyses the arguments put forward by Plantinga to justify his refutation of evolutionary reliabilism, i.e. the claim that the probability that the cognitive faculties, developed in the process of unguided evolution, are reliable is low. I argue that all the thought experiments offered by Plantinga to justify this thesis suffer from a common defect – they disregard the condition of evolution or fail to take it into account properly. In addition, I argue that pointing out the difficulties that naturalistic approaches have in explaining mental causation does not lead to Plantinga’s conclusion that in a naturalistic world there would be no mental causation whatsoever.alvin plantingadarwin’s doubtevolutionary reliabilismthe evolutionary argument against naturalism
spellingShingle Fábiková, Andrea
Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
Filosofický časopis
alvin plantinga
darwin’s doubt
evolutionary reliabilism
the evolutionary argument against naturalism
title Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
title_full Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
title_fullStr Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
title_full_unstemmed Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
title_short Adaptivity and truth. A critique of Plantinga’s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
title_sort adaptivity and truth a critique of plantinga s reasoning against evolutionary reliabilism
topic alvin plantinga
darwin’s doubt
evolutionary reliabilism
the evolutionary argument against naturalism
work_keys_str_mv AT fabikovaandrea adaptivityandtruthacritiqueofplantingasreasoningagainstevolutionaryreliabilism