Are moral intuitions intellectual perceptions?
This paper discusses an influential view of moral intuition, according to which moral intuition is a kind of intellectual perception. The core claim of this quasi-perceptualist theory is that intuitions are like perceptual experiences in presenting propositions as true. In this work, it is argued th...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2022-04-01
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| Series: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
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| Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2022.0003 |
| Summary: | This paper discusses an influential view of moral intuition, according to which moral intuition is a kind of intellectual perception. The core claim of this quasi-perceptualist theory is that intuitions are like perceptual experiences in presenting propositions as true. In this work, it is argued that quasi-perceptualism is explanatorily superfluous in the moral domain: there is no need to postulate a sui generis quasi-perceptual mental state to account for moral intuition since rival theories can explain the salient mental features of moral intuition. The essay is structured into three main sections. In a first one, I introduce the quasi-perceptualist view of moral intuition. In the second, I show that ordinary accounts can explain the salient psychological features of moral intuition without referring to intellectual perceptions. Finally, in the third section, I discuss whether moral intuitions have presentational phenomenology like perceptual experiences. |
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| ISSN: | 2039-4667 2239-2629 |