Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normat...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2000-06-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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| Online Access: | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553 |
| Summary: | This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normative ends, e.g. theory choice. Differently from that quite excessive evaluation, Kitcher argues rather for explanatory unity as the most important and universal epistemic value. Even though Kitcher's arguments are sound, there remains some serious gaps as regards his attempts; there are also serious doubts about the desirability of achieving such a value. |
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| ISSN: | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |