Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normat...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2000-06-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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Online Access: | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553 |
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author | Eduardo Salles O. Barra |
author_facet | Eduardo Salles O. Barra |
author_sort | Eduardo Salles O. Barra |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normative ends, e.g. theory choice. Differently from that quite excessive evaluation, Kitcher argues rather for explanatory unity as the most important and universal epistemic value. Even though Kitcher's arguments are sound, there remains some serious gaps as regards his attempts; there are also serious doubts about the desirability of achieving such a value. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-12T10:16:52Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-61c34cf0fa0f468480cf1643f9b9b26c |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-12T10:16:52Z |
publishDate | 2000-06-01 |
publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
record_format | Article |
series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
spelling | doaj.art-61c34cf0fa0f468480cf1643f9b9b26c2022-12-22T00:27:38ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112000-06-01041126Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip KitcherEduardo Salles O. BarraThis paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normative ends, e.g. theory choice. Differently from that quite excessive evaluation, Kitcher argues rather for explanatory unity as the most important and universal epistemic value. Even though Kitcher's arguments are sound, there remains some serious gaps as regards his attempts; there are also serious doubts about the desirability of achieving such a value.http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553normative naturalismPhilip Kitcherepistemics valuesaim of sciencescientific realism |
spellingShingle | Eduardo Salles O. Barra Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology normative naturalism Philip Kitcher epistemics values aim of science scientific realism |
title | Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher |
title_full | Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher |
title_fullStr | Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher |
title_full_unstemmed | Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher |
title_short | Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher |
title_sort | valores epistemicos no naturalismo normativo de philip kitcher |
topic | normative naturalism Philip Kitcher epistemics values aim of science scientific realism |
url | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT eduardosallesobarra valoresepistemicosnonaturalismonormativodephilipkitcher |