Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher

This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normat...

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Main Author: Eduardo Salles O. Barra
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2000-06-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553
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author Eduardo Salles O. Barra
author_facet Eduardo Salles O. Barra
author_sort Eduardo Salles O. Barra
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description This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normative ends, e.g. theory choice. Differently from that quite excessive evaluation, Kitcher argues rather for explanatory unity as the most important and universal epistemic value. Even though Kitcher's arguments are sound, there remains some serious gaps as regards his attempts; there are also serious doubts about the desirability of achieving such a value.
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spelling doaj.art-61c34cf0fa0f468480cf1643f9b9b26c2022-12-22T00:27:38ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112000-06-01041126Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip KitcherEduardo Salles O. BarraThis paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normative ends, e.g. theory choice. Differently from that quite excessive evaluation, Kitcher argues rather for explanatory unity as the most important and universal epistemic value. Even though Kitcher's arguments are sound, there remains some serious gaps as regards his attempts; there are also serious doubts about the desirability of achieving such a value.http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553normative naturalismPhilip Kitcherepistemics valuesaim of sciencescientific realism
spellingShingle Eduardo Salles O. Barra
Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
normative naturalism
Philip Kitcher
epistemics values
aim of science
scientific realism
title Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
title_full Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
title_fullStr Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
title_full_unstemmed Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
title_short Valores Epistêmicos no Naturalismo Normativo de Philip Kitcher
title_sort valores epistemicos no naturalismo normativo de philip kitcher
topic normative naturalism
Philip Kitcher
epistemics values
aim of science
scientific realism
url http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19054/17553
work_keys_str_mv AT eduardosallesobarra valoresepistemicosnonaturalismonormativodephilipkitcher