Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries
Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
The Royal Society
2020-07-01
|
| Series: | Royal Society Open Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.200621 |
| _version_ | 1818980198546145280 |
|---|---|
| author | Eric Zettermann Dias de Azevedo David Valença Dantas Fábio G. Daura-Jorge |
| author_facet | Eric Zettermann Dias de Azevedo David Valença Dantas Fábio G. Daura-Jorge |
| author_sort | Eric Zettermann Dias de Azevedo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social parameters that might favour cooperation. We assessed the degrees to which risk tolerance and control perception affect the cooperative behaviours of fishers in a restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF) in southern Brazil. We also assessed the likelihood of a scenario wherein a cooperative strategy can evolve and dominate the system. We identified dominance and coexistence outcomes for the RSSF. Sensitivity analyses suggested that both control perception and risk tolerance could facilitate a cooperative outcome for the fishery. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-20T17:11:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6233d122ec944ef2a0374f4f9d3e5891 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2054-5703 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-20T17:11:37Z |
| publishDate | 2020-07-01 |
| publisher | The Royal Society |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Royal Society Open Science |
| spelling | doaj.art-6233d122ec944ef2a0374f4f9d3e58912022-12-21T19:32:07ZengThe Royal SocietyRoyal Society Open Science2054-57032020-07-017710.1098/rsos.200621200621Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheriesEric Zettermann Dias de AzevedoDavid Valença DantasFábio G. Daura-JorgeCooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social parameters that might favour cooperation. We assessed the degrees to which risk tolerance and control perception affect the cooperative behaviours of fishers in a restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF) in southern Brazil. We also assessed the likelihood of a scenario wherein a cooperative strategy can evolve and dominate the system. We identified dominance and coexistence outcomes for the RSSF. Sensitivity analyses suggested that both control perception and risk tolerance could facilitate a cooperative outcome for the fishery.https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.200621cooperationbioeconomic modelsevolutionary game theorysmall-scale fisheryfisher behaviourcompliance |
| spellingShingle | Eric Zettermann Dias de Azevedo David Valença Dantas Fábio G. Daura-Jorge Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries Royal Society Open Science cooperation bioeconomic models evolutionary game theory small-scale fishery fisher behaviour compliance |
| title | Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries |
| title_full | Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries |
| title_fullStr | Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries |
| title_full_unstemmed | Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries |
| title_short | Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries |
| title_sort | risk tolerance and control perception in a game theoretic bioeconomic model for small scale fisheries |
| topic | cooperation bioeconomic models evolutionary game theory small-scale fishery fisher behaviour compliance |
| url | https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.200621 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ericzettermanndiasdeazevedo risktoleranceandcontrolperceptioninagametheoreticbioeconomicmodelforsmallscalefisheries AT davidvalencadantas risktoleranceandcontrolperceptioninagametheoreticbioeconomicmodelforsmallscalefisheries AT fabiogdaurajorge risktoleranceandcontrolperceptioninagametheoreticbioeconomicmodelforsmallscalefisheries |