Kinds of Information in Scientific Use
There are many different mathematical definitions of information that have their various uses, but I will be concerned with notions of information used in applications in various branches of science that are distinguished by their topic, i.e., what they apply to. I describe the major uses informatio...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Paderborn University: Media Systems and Media Organisation Research Group
2011-10-01
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| Series: | tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique |
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| Online Access: | https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/278 |
| _version_ | 1797716519622279168 |
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| author | John Collier |
| author_facet | John Collier |
| author_sort | John Collier |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | There are many different mathematical definitions of information that have their various uses, but I will be concerned with notions of information used in applications in various branches of science that are distinguished by their topic, i.e., what they apply to. I describe the major uses information, and show their relations to each other. I will argue that the various uses form a nested hierarchy, in which each is a restriction on the previous, inheriting the properties of its predecessor, but adding in new features that make it a special case. The lowest level is physical information determined by distinctions and the highest is explicit representation in linguistic social communication. Is there anything common to information at all these levels? I will argue that there is, and that information in each case is what Donald MacKay (1969) called a distinction that makes a difference. What distinguishes the use of information at each level is what distinctions make a causal difference at that level. At each successive level distinctions that make a difference at a previous level make no difference at that level. In order to create this sort of filter new levels have to be formed by cohesion peculiar to the identifying characteristics at that level. A consequence of this view is that information must have causal powers, and that there is a tight connection between information and causation |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:22:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6261b19d32c5481a93b953a6b08baa52 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1726-670X 1726-670X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:22:38Z |
| publishDate | 2011-10-01 |
| publisher | Paderborn University: Media Systems and Media Organisation Research Group |
| record_format | Article |
| series | tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique |
| spelling | doaj.art-6261b19d32c5481a93b953a6b08baa522023-09-02T18:20:22ZengPaderborn University: Media Systems and Media Organisation Research GrouptripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique1726-670X1726-670X2011-10-019229530410.31269/triplec.v9i2.278278Kinds of Information in Scientific UseJohn Collier0of Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South AfricaThere are many different mathematical definitions of information that have their various uses, but I will be concerned with notions of information used in applications in various branches of science that are distinguished by their topic, i.e., what they apply to. I describe the major uses information, and show their relations to each other. I will argue that the various uses form a nested hierarchy, in which each is a restriction on the previous, inheriting the properties of its predecessor, but adding in new features that make it a special case. The lowest level is physical information determined by distinctions and the highest is explicit representation in linguistic social communication. Is there anything common to information at all these levels? I will argue that there is, and that information in each case is what Donald MacKay (1969) called a distinction that makes a difference. What distinguishes the use of information at each level is what distinctions make a causal difference at that level. At each successive level distinctions that make a difference at a previous level make no difference at that level. In order to create this sort of filter new levels have to be formed by cohesion peculiar to the identifying characteristics at that level. A consequence of this view is that information must have causal powers, and that there is a tight connection between information and causationhttps://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/278Informationcausation“it from bit”entropynatural hierarchyfunctionrepresentationintentionalitymeaningreferencecommunication |
| spellingShingle | John Collier Kinds of Information in Scientific Use tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique Information causation “it from bit” entropy natural hierarchy function representation intentionality meaning reference communication |
| title | Kinds of Information in Scientific Use |
| title_full | Kinds of Information in Scientific Use |
| title_fullStr | Kinds of Information in Scientific Use |
| title_full_unstemmed | Kinds of Information in Scientific Use |
| title_short | Kinds of Information in Scientific Use |
| title_sort | kinds of information in scientific use |
| topic | Information causation “it from bit” entropy natural hierarchy function representation intentionality meaning reference communication |
| url | https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/278 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT johncollier kindsofinformationinscientificuse |